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THE PROPOSED STATE ETHICS COMMISSION ACT:
REFORM FOR NEW MEXICO’S “WILD WEST”†
POLITICS, OR SIMPLY A MIRAGE?
ERIN MCSHERRY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to state government scandals and the resulting public outcry, the
New Mexico Legislature has considered adopting a “state ethics commission act”
for several years.1 The 2010 regular legislative session marked the fourth legislative
session during which such a proposal was introduced.2 Each version of the proposed act has included the creation of an ethics commission, intended to be an
independent government-oversight agency.3 The proposals have been consistent to
the degree that they would create and mandate an ethics commission to: investigate alleged “ethics violations” committed by government actors, hold hearings,
issue or recommend discipline for ethics violations, and train government actors in
ethics.4 Additional proposed commission responsibilities have varied between proposals.5 None of the proposals, however, has been designed to address the causes
of known government scandals.6 Perhaps even more concerning, however, is the
array of new problems such an ethics commission could create if one of the proposals were enacted.7
Some New Mexico politicians have protested proposed ethics reform legislation,
arguing, “[y]ou’re never going to be able to legislate morals.”8 That assertion may
be true, depending on what is meant by “ethics.” Laws are often passed in the
name of “ethics reform,”9 but is the label simply a misnomer? Merriam Webster’s
Dictionary defines “ethic(s)” as:

† Stephanie Simon, New Mexico’s Political Wild West, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2009, at A5. “A cascade
of recent corruption scandals,” including a “pay-to-play” federal investigation of Governor Bill Richardson’s
administration, prompted another look at the state’s political culture. Id.
* University of New Mexico School of Law, Class of 2010. Erin thanks those individuals who assisted
her in researching her topic, including members of the 2006 and 2007 task forces on ethics reform, New
Mexico legislators, and a local reporter. She also thanks those who assisted her in her writing, including
Professor Elizabeth Rapaport, Professor Michael Browde, and New Mexico Law Review editors Kevin Pierce,
Jonathan Tsosie, and Neil Bell. All opinions expressed are her own.
1. See discussion infra Part II.
2. See S.B. 43, 108, 154, & 268, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2010) (as substituted by the senate rules
committee); see also New Mexico Legislature, Bill Locator, http://www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/_locatorcom.aspx?year=10 (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
3. See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
4. See GOVERNOR RICHARDSON’S TASK FORCE ON ETHICS REFORM, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 8 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS].
5. See discussion infra Part III.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. “‘The issue here is ethical conduct,’ [House Speaker Ben Lujan] said of the proposed commission.
‘You’re never going to be able to legislate morals. You have those rules in Congress and look at what is
happening there.’” Tripp Jennings, JOURNAL POLL Tougher Ethics Supported, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 11,
2007, at A1 [hereinafter Tougher Ethics Supported]. “‘You can’t legislate ethics,’ [Senator] Ingle said. ‘You
either have ethics or you don’t.’” Tripp Jennings, Ethics Reform on Life Support; Sen. Gives Bill a 50-50
Chance, ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 27, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter Reform on Life Support].
9. See generally National Council on State Legislators, Ethics in the News 2009, http://www.ncsl.org/
programs/ethics/Ethics_in_the_News09.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (listing ethics legislation by state for
2009).
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1 . . . : the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with moral
duty and obligation 2A : a set of moral principles: a theory or system of
moral values . . . B pl but sing or pl in constr : the principles of conduct
governing an individual or a group <professional ~s> C : a guiding philosophy D : a consciousness of moral importance . . . 3 pl : a set of moral issues
or aspects (as rightness) . . .10

The first and third definitions pertain to morality. Whether legislating morality is a
proper function of lawmakers is an ongoing debate.11 The second definition, however, particularly part “b,” describes the type of reform pursued through modern
governmental “ethics reform.”12 While standards for ethical conduct may vary by
profession,13 it is possible to codify the principles of appropriate conduct governing
a particular group.14 By analogy, one may consider government ethics legislation as
the codification of professional conduct for government officials, or as the codification of professional canons applied to public employees and officials, similar to the
use of ethics codes in other professions.15
Despite some legislators’ objections to “legislating ethics,” bills proposing a
state ethics commission passed the New Mexico House of Representatives unanimously during the 2008 and 2009 New Mexico legislative sessions.16 While no version of such a bill has yet passed the New Mexico Senate, legislators are likely to
continue to introduce versions of the proposal, because interest in government ethics reform in New Mexico persists.17 Further, ethics commissions are gaining status
as a standard element in state governments. Commissions are now established, in
some form, in forty states.18 While the perceived political climate in New Mexico
could make any ethics reform measure attractive, this note suggests that: (1) reform legislation should be designed to resolve known problems and no ethics commission proposal has yet done so; and (2) proposed state ethics commission acts
should be modified to avoid likely pitfalls.19
This note reviews the impetus for the proposal of a New Mexico ethics commission, describes the 2009 proposal’s development and provisions, assesses the 2009
proposed commission’s likely effectiveness, and finally, suggests improvements.
10. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 429 (11th ed. 2003). Similarly, “ethical” is defined as: “1 : of or relating to ethics <~theories> 2 : involving or expressing moral approval or disapproval
<~judgments> 3 : conforming to accepted professional standards of conduct <~behavior> 4 : of a drug : restricted to sale only on a doctor’s prescription” Id. (first emphasis added).
11. Michael S. Moore, Four Reflections on Law and Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1523, 1538–41
(2007).
12. See generally Susan Frelich Appleton & Robyn M. Rimmer, Power Couples: Lawmakers, Lobbyists,
and the State of Their Unions, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 207 (2007).
13. Journalists and lawyers are examples. See Society of Professional Journalists, Code of Ethics, http://
www.spj.org/pdf/ethicscode.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2009). Legal ethics are: “1. standards of professional conduct applicable to members of the legal profession . . . 2. The study of such standards. 3. A lawyer’s practical
observance of, or conformity to, established standards of professional conduct.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
976 (9th ed. 2009). Teachers similarly have professional rules. See Association of American Educators, Code of
Ethics, http://www.aaeteachers.org/code-ethics.shtml (last visited Dec. 29, 2009).
14. See supra note 13 (regarding professional ethics codes).
15. See supra note 13.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Ethics Oversight Agencies, http://
www.ncsl.org/programs/ethics/comprehensive_list.htm (last visited Dec. 24, 2009).
19. See infra Parts IV–V.
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Part II places the New Mexico ethics commission proposal into a timeline and into
a political context. In order to consider a version of the proposal most likely to
become state law, Part III summarizes the legislation that passed the New Mexico
House of Representatives in 2009.20 Part IV examines issues that undermine the
appeal of the proposed commission, considering factors such as appropriateness,
feasibility, and constitutionality. Part V proposes an alternative framework from
which to approach ethics reform in New Mexico, and suggests amendments to ethics commission enabling legislation to address the issues raised by this note in Part
IV.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Impetus for Ethics Reform in New Mexico
Calls for governmental ethics reform often follow widely publicized government
scandal. State legislatures passed a wave of state legislation in the name of ethics
reform following Watergate.21 After Watergate, state governments in particular began creating “ethics infrastructure” that included stricter laws, ethics training, and
oversight entities.22
Scandal was the recent impetus for New Mexico to pursue ethics reform proposals as well. On September 13, 2005, the New Mexico State Treasurer, Robert Vigil,
and former Treasurer, Michael Montoya, were federally indicted for extortion and
racketeering.23 A jury convicted Vigil for attempted extortion in violation of the
Hobbs Act,24 and sentenced him to thirty-seven months in prison followed by three
years supervised release. Under a plea deal in which he agreed to cooperate with
ongoing investigations, Montoya pled guilty to one count of extortion, and admitted he took bribes “almost since he took office.”25
B. Pursuit of New Mexico Reform in 2006
Within months of the indictments and Montoya’s guilty plea, New Mexico legislators proposed legislation to enact ethics reform.26 Proposed bills would have increased oversight over the state treasurer’s office, increased penalties for
corruption, and limited campaign contributions and gifts.27 Although the 2006 ses20. See H.B. 151 & 614, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009) (as passed by the New Mexico House of
Representatives); see also New Mexico Legislature, Bill Locator, http://www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/_locatorcom.aspx?year=09 (last visited Dec. 29, 2009).
21. Nicole Casal Moore & Peggy Kerns, State Ethics Commissions, LEGISBRIEF (Nat’l Conference of
State Legislatures, Denver, Colo.), Apr./May 2006.
22. Id.
23. Both indictment counts accused Vigil of Hobbs Act extortion violations. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006).
The grand jury returned three subsequent superseding indictments. The fourth accused Vigil of engaging in a
pattern of racketeering, conspiring to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d), and money laundering, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), attempted extortion, and violating
the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. See Brief for Appellee at 1–2, United States v. Vigil, 523 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir.
2008) (No. 07-2060); see also Andy Lenderman, New Mexico State Treasurers Indicted in Kickback Scheme,
SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Sept. 17, 2005, at C4.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
25. See Scott Sandlin, Former Treasurer Montoya Pleads Guilty to Extortion, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 8,
2005, at A1.
26. See Tripp Jennings, 20 Bills Propose Ethics Reforms, ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 12, 2006, at A10. New
Mexico legislative sessions start the third Tuesday of January. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 5(A).
27. Jennings, 20 Bills Proposed Ethics Reforms, supra note 26 at A10.
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sion was a “short session,” traditionally limited to budget issues,28 New Mexico
Governor Bill Richardson endorsed a package of “anticorruption and campaign
reporting initiatives.”29
Only one ethics reform bill passed in 2006. The new law requires prospective
state contractors to disclose campaign contributions made during the two years
prior to submitting proposals for state contracts, and bans these contractors from
making campaign contributions or giving things of value during the contracting
process.30 During the 2006 legislative session, Governor Richardson also supported
a proposed campaign reporting act that would have required increased candidate
reporting frequency and reporting detail, a bill that would have increased secretary
of state oversight and enforcement powers, and an amended version of the government conduct act.31 These bills did not pass.
After the 2006 legislative session, Richardson announced he had created “Governor Richardson’s Task Force on Ethics and Elections Reform” (2006 Task
Force).32 His executive order stated that “recent events at the federal33 and state
level make it abundantly clear that strong ethics and campaign finance laws are
essential building blocks in forming an effective state government.”34 He cited, as
essential, that “the public has the utmost confidence in their government and [confidence] that [the government] works exclusively to advance the best interests of
the people of New Mexico.”35 The order called for the 2006 Task Force to study
governmental ethics and campaign finance reform, including a review of current
laws and regulations.36 Based on this study, the 2006 Task Force was to develop a
broad package of recommendations for presentation to Richardson prior to the
2007 regular legislative session.37 The 2006 Task Force members included New

28. Non-budgetary bills may be introduced only if their subject matter appears in a “special message”
from the governor’s office. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 5(B)2. The session was “short,” meaning it lasted thirty
days. New Mexico legislators meet for either a thirty- or sixty-day regular session each year. Id. § 5(A)–(B).
Thirty-day sessions reserved for budgetary issues alternate with the longer sessions that are open to all other
types of legislation. Id. § 5(A). Despite the reserved purpose for short sessions, numerous non-budgetary bills
are often included in special messages from the governor. See, e.g., New Mexico Legislature, Bill Locator,
http://www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/_locatorcom.aspx?year=10 (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
29. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Bill Richardson Announces State Treasurer, Former UNM Law School Dean to Spearhead Efforts to Pass Comprehensive Anti-Corruption, Campaign Reporting Initiatives (Jan. 19, 2006) (on file with author).
30. See S.B. 344, 47th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2006). The bill also provides for disclosure of the prospective contractor’s family and representatives’ contributions. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Bill Richardson Forms Bipartisan Task Force to Craft Sweeping Ethics Reform Plan (Apr. 20, 2006) (on
file with author).
31. Compare Press Release, supra note 30, with N.M. LEGIS. COUNCIL SERV., 2006 CONCORDANCE
REPORT, 47th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2006) (listing all legislation passed during the 2006 session).
32. N.M. Exec. Order 2006-021a (May 30, 2006) (on file with author).
33. Federal lobbyist Jack Abramoff pled guilty in January 2006 to fraud, tax evasion, and conspiracy to
bribe public officials; many other public officials were implicated. Peter Whoriskey & William Branigin,
Abramoff Is Sentenced for Casino Boat Fraud, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2006, at A1.
34. Exec. Order 2006-021a (May 30, 2006) (on file with author).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Mexico state legislators, other government officials, public policy non-governmental organization leaders, and members of the general public.38
After seven meetings, “[e]stablishing an independent state ethics commission”
was the first of six 2006 Task Force recommendations.39 The recommendation proposed charging an ethics commission with promoting increased accountability for
ethical behavior through deterrence,40 education, and improving appointing individuals’ awareness of their appointees’ unethical activity.41 The 2006 Task Force’s
recommended ethics commission would have, by statute and by constitutional
amendment, powers to investigate allegations of unethical conduct of public officials, government contractors, and lobbyists.42 To aid in investigations, an ethics
commission would have subpoena power.43 Further, a separate “whistleblower protection act,” or clause, would be integrated into the commission’s enabling statute,
to encourage “the submission of good faith reports.”44 The commission would discipline by reprimand or censure, or by recommending removal, suspension, or demotion by a party’s employing entity.45 It would provide education and training in
ethical conduct. Specifically, it would implement a “plain language ethics guide”
and a “business ethics guide;”46 it would establish statewide standards of conduct
and implement mandatory training programs for public officers and employees.47
The recommendation was hedged on the premise that the commission would receive “adequate authority, funding and staffing.”48 The 2006 Task Force estimated
adequate funding for such a commission as requiring at least $1,000,000 annually,
and estimated adequate personnel for such a commission as requiring ten staff
members.49
A commission would have limited interaction with the legislative and judicial
branch under the 2006 Task Force recommendation.50 Legislative oversight by the
38. Id. Richardson appointed Garrey Carruthers and Suellen Scarnecchia as 2006 Task Force cochairpersons. See 2006 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 4, at 3; see also Appendix 1 (listing the
2006 Task Force members and their affiliations).
39. 2006 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 4, at 8. Richardson directed the 2006 Task
Force to develop comprehensive ethics and campaign finance reform recommendations; “everything was on
the table” and members should “be bold.” Id. at 3. The 2006 Task Force methodology was to review existing
law; discuss issues to explore; select focus areas and divide into discussion groups; discuss best practices; review options; invite expert speakers from other states to discuss implementation of specific ethics initiatives;
research and discuss issues affecting ethics and campaign finance reform; and form subcommittees to make
specific recommendations. Id. at 6–7, 10. David Freel, Executive Director of the Ohio Ethics Commission, and
Todd Lang, Executive Director, Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission, were expert speakers about
ethics commissions. Id. at 6. The five additional 2006 Task Force recommendations sought to address gifts
limits, campaign limits and increased reporting, legislator compensation, appointment process changes, state
treasurer and auditor qualifications, and publicly financed campaigns. Id. at 2.
40. “The threat of investigation of unethical conduct and sanctions for such conduct will serve as a
deterrent for unethical practices in state government.” Id. at 9.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 8, 10.
43. Id. at 8.
44. Id. at 9.
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id. at 9. The 2006 Task Force recommendation asserted that individuals trained in ethical and unethical behavior “are less likely to engage in behavior that raises ethical questions.” Id. The recommendation
did not cite a source for this assertion.
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id. at 9.
49. Id. at 10.
50. Id. at 8.
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commission would be limited to investigation of legislators, with a commission “remitting the results of an investigation to the legislature and making recommendations regarding discipline at the legislature’s discretion.”51 The New Mexico
Judicial Standards Commission (JSC), an existing government agency with oversight of judges, would retain the sole oversight authority for the judicial branch.52
C. Further New Mexico Scandal in 2006 Provides Fuel for Reform
A federal corruption investigation into the construction of the Bernalillo
County Metropolitan Courthouse in Albuquerque, New Mexico, kept public attention on ethics legislation as the 2007 legislative session approached.53 The longanticipated indictments came about during the 2007 session. Former Senate Pro
Tempore Manny Aragon, former Albuquerque Mayor Ken Schultz, former metropolitan court administrator Toby Martinez, Martinez’s wife Sandra Mata Martinez,
and metropolitan court project engineer Raul Parra, were accused with collectively
skimming $4,200,000 in public funds off of the $83,000,000 that financed the construction of the metropolitan court.54 Plea agreements from former Mayor Schultz,
courthouse architect Marc Schiff, and courthouse contractor Manual Guara, became public the same day as the indictments.55
D. Pursuit of New Mexico Reform in 2007
Despite the continued public following, and the apparent public support for the
2006 Task Force recommendations,56 only one 2006 Task Force proposal was signed
into law after the 2007 regular legislative session.57 Lawmakers were unable to
come to agreement regarding an ethics commission.58 Even if the legislature had
enacted the ethics commission bill drafted for consideration, that bill did not include the 2006 Task Force recommendations for commission funding and staff. The
resulting commission would not have had sufficient funding to carry out a fraction
of its outlined responsibilities.59

51. Id.
52. Id. Election oversight and associated campaign law oversight were contemplated, but determined
better addressed through a separate entity, or by increased funding for the New Mexico Secretary of State. Id.
at 9.
53. Jennings, Reform on Life Support, supra note 6, at A1.
54. Mike Gallagher & Scott Sandlin, Accused of $4.2 Million Ripoff: Manny Aragon, Former Mayor
Ken Schultz, Five Other People Linked to Scheme to Defraud State in the Building of the Metro Courthouse,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Mar. 30, 2007, at A1.
55. Id.
56. Jennings, Tougher Ethics Supported, supra note 8, at A1 (citing a public poll that indicated public
support for task force recommendations).
57. See LEGIS. COUNCIL SERV., CONCORDANCE REPORT, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2007). The only
2006 Task Force recommended legislation that passed set limits on gifts to public officials. See S.B. 931, 48th
Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2007). In addition, during a special session, a bill passed the legislature enacting public
campaign financing for appellate judge elections. See H.B. 6, 48th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (N.M. 2007).
58. While the house of representatives vote was heavily in support of passing the proposal, with fiftyeight members in support and four members opposed, the bill did not make it to the senate floor. Trip Jennings, House Approves State Ethics Panel; Funding Still in Question, ALBUQUERQUE J., Mar. 8, 2007, at A8;
see also LEGIS. COUNCIL SERV., CONCORDANCE REPORT, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2007).
59. Before the house of representatives passed the bill, proposed commission funding was amended to
$250,000. Jennings, Tougher Ethics Supported, supra note 8, at A8.
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With little of the 2006 Task Force’s agenda enacted during 2007, Richardson
reestablished the group.60 He called upon the 2007 Task Force to reevaluate the
2006 Task Force proposals that had not passed into law, and to draft a new slate of
recommendations for the 2008 legislative session.61 After meeting five times, the
2007 Task Force recommendations again included creating an ethics commission.62
The 2007 Task Force ethics commission recommendation differed significantly
from the previous year’s recommendations. Most significantly, it called for judges63
and judicial employees to fall under the commission’s jurisdiction, and specified
that ethics violations would arise under existing statutes rather than a separate
ethics code.64 Results of investigations into legislative and judicial branch members’ conduct would be remitted to the legislature or to the JSC.65 The 2007 Task
Force reduced the recommended commission funding by half to $500,000, and the
anticipated staffing for the commission was not mentioned in the recommendation.66 The recommendation called for the commission to have the authority to
establish its own regulations and the power to file complaints.67 It conditioned the
commission’s powers would be limited to the relevant standards of due process of
law, and provided that the commission’s investigations should not interfere with
ongoing criminal investigations.68 Commission proceedings would become public
only if the commission were to determine that good cause existed that an ethics
violation had occurred.69 The 2007 Task Force recommendation also made many
specific recommendations regarding commission membership and required tasks.70
60. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Richardson Names Members of Reinstated
Ethics Reform Task Force (Apr. 20, 2007) (on file with author); see also Appendix 2 (listing 2007 Task Force
members and their affiliations).
61. Id.
62. The 2007 Task Force reconvened with the same chairpersons, much the same membership, and it
followed the same methodology as the 2006 Task Force. GOVERNOR RICHARDSON’S TASK FORCE ON ETHICS
REFORM, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS]; see
also Appendix 2 (listing 2007 Task Force members and their affiliations). As an additional step to its methodology, however, the 2007 Task Force also reviewed the experience of the members of the 2006 Task Force
promoting the bills that were based on the 2006 Task Force recommendations during the 2007 sessions. 2007
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at 5; see also 2006 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 4
(discussing 2006 Task Force methodology). The proposal for a state ethics commission act was drafted as
House Bill 309 in 2008. H.B. 309, 48th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2008); see also LEGIS. FINANCE COMM., FISCAL
IMPACT REPORT, H.B. 309, 48th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2008).
63. This aspect of the recommendation, including jurisdiction over judges, was a five to one subcommittee vote, with JSC Director Jim Noel voting against the provision. See GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON ETHICS
REFORM, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CREATION OF A STATE ETHICS COMMISSION 5–6 (2007).
64. Specifically, these complaints could arise under the gift act, government conduct act, procurement
code, lobbyist regulation act, financial disclosure act, and New Mexico statutes relating to campaign practices.
2007 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 62, at 7; see also infra note 109 (listing full citations for all
relevant statutes).
65. 2007 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 62, at 7.
66. Id. at 10. The New Mexico Department of Finance and Administration estimated the commission’s
cost at $500,000, based on estimates of $268,000 for staff salaries, $75,000 for contractual services, and $156,000
for administrative costs. Id. It is not clear what staff positions were included in this estimate.
67. Id. at 7.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 8.
70. The recommendation added further new details: a three-year statute of limitations, required geographical diversity in commissioner selection, commissioner disqualification for conflict of interest and replacement with a temporary commissioner, and requiring the commission to submit an annual report to the
governor, legislature, and chief justice of the supreme court. Id. at 8. The annual report would include recommendations for commission jurisdiction, particularly as it related to local-government jurisdiction. Id.

R

R
R

\\server05\productn\N\NMX\39-3\NMX306.txt

604

unknown

Seq: 8

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

18-JUN-10

11:45

[Vol. 39

The 2007 Task Force recommendations were considered in the drafting of a new
package of ethics reform bills proposed during the 2008 legislative session.
E. State Scandal in 2007 Sustains Interest in Ethics Reform
By the 2008 legislative session, former New Mexico Treasurers Robert Vigil and
Michael Montoya were sentenced to prison,71 former New Mexico Senator Manny
Aragon was awaiting trial in a federal kickback investigation, and former New
Mexico Deputy Insurance Superintendent Joe Ruiz had just been indicted for
thirty counts of fraud and corruption.72 Indictments alleged that Ruiz proposed
“win-win” options to insurance companies faced with state fines: if an insurance
company accepted Ruiz’s offer, New Mexico Insurance Department fines would be
lowered in exchange for donations to a nonprofit organization that published
Ruiz’s books.73 With continued public attention on government corruption, the
stage was set for another attempt to pass ethics legislation.
F. Legislative Response in 2008
The ethics commission bill based on the 2007 Task Force recommendation for
such a commission passed the New Mexico House of Representatives unanimously
in 2008.74 Once again, however, it never reached the New Mexico Senate floor.75
Before it passed the house, the bill was amended by the house appropriations and
finance committee, cutting the bill’s associated funding to $250,000.76 Richardson
did not reconvene an ethics task force in 2008, nor did any other group review the
2007 Task Force’s ethics commission recommendation. Thus, the proposed state
ethics commission act was not reviewed again before the 2009 legislative session.
G. Public Corruption Still at the Forefront Entering the 2009 Legislative Session
Investigations into New Mexico Housing Authority operations, combined with a
federal inquiry into the Richardson administration’s business practices, were
among the reasons ethics reform proposals remained in the news in 2009.77 Shortly
before the 2009 session, the New Mexico State Auditor, Hector Balderas, released
portions of a housing authority audit, reporting his office’s findings that the New
Mexico Region III Housing Authority misspent New Mexico State Investment
Council-purchased bonds in 2006.78 Balderas was quoted as saying, “[g]overnment

71. Steve Terrell, Lawmakers Shy Away from Major Ethics Reform, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Feb. 15,
2008, at A8.
72. Colleen Heild & Mike Gallagher, Former State Official Indicted in Extortion; Aide Allegedly
Squeezed Insurers, ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 25, 2007, at A1.
73. Id.
74. See Sun News Report: Bill to Create a State Ethics Commission, Sponsored by Las Cruces’ Rep.
Mary Helen Garcia, Passes Muster in House, LAS CRUCES SUN-NEWS, Feb. 12, 2008.
75. See H.B. 309, 48th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2008); see also New Mexico Legislature, Bill Locator, http://
www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/_locatorcom.aspx?year=08 (last visited Dec. 26, 2009).
76. See HOUSE APPROPRIATION AND FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, H.B. 309, 48th Leg., 2d Sess.
(N.M. 2008).
77. Heath Haussamen, Gary King and Bill Richardson Will Push Ethics Reform in Upcoming Legislative Session, N.M. INDEP., Jan. 9, 2009, available at http://newmexicoindependent.com/14591/ag-guv-will-pushethics-reform-in-coming-session.
78. Thomas J. Cole, Audit Shows Trip, Booze Purchases; New Housing Authority Probe Reveals Questionable Expenses, Reimbursements, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 15, 2009, at A1.
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must continue to do a better job accounting for programs that are supposed to
assist the most vulnerable citizens of our state.”79 The misspent bonds were intended to purchase and renovate homes for low-income buyers.80 The council filed
a lawsuit against the authority’s former director, Vincent “Smiley” Gallegos, accusing him with responsibility for the misspent funds.81 At the same time, an investigation into the Richardson administration inquired whether the selection of certain
financial advisors for “GRIP” (Governor Richardson’s Investment Project), who
had also donated funds to Richardson-founded political action committees, “Moving America Forward” and “Si Se Puede!,” was in accordance with applicable procurement laws.82
H. 2009 Legislative (Non) Action
In 2009, Gary King, the New Mexico Attorney General, and Richardson publicly supported legislation creating an ethics commission. King endorsed an ethics
reform package that included the ethics commission legislation that passed the
New Mexico House of Representatives the previous year.83 He pursued sponsorship for the ethics commission bill in the New Mexico Senate.84 The only difference
between the 2008 legislation, and the 2009 King-endorsed legislation, was that the
King-endorsed bill returned proposed commission funding to $500,000 as recommended by the 2007 Task Force.85 During his 2009 state of the state speech, Richardson stated that creation of an independent, bipartisan, ethics commission was a
priority for ethics reform.86
Despite the support from King and the Richardson during the 2009 legislative
session, an ethics commission bill did not pass. The bill specifically endorsed by
King did not leave the senate rules committee.87 Another similar ethics commission
bill, however, House Bill 151, passed the house of representatives unanimously
shortly before the end of the session. House Bill 151 is summarized in Part III of
this note, and, although it is similar to the 2008 ethics commission proposal, it also
has some significant differences.88
I. New Mexico Public Scandal Continues . . .
After the 2009 legislative session ended, Jerome Block, Jr., a recently elected
New Mexico Public Regulation Commission commissioner, was indicted for crimi-

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Haussamen, supra note 77.
83. See H.B. 309, 48th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2008).
84. Senator Dede Feldman introduced the proposal as Senate Bill 140. See Press Release, Office of the
Attorney General, AG King Proposes Ambitious Legislative Agenda (Jan. 9, 2009) (on file with author).
85. The bill included an appropriation of $500,000 before it was amended and passed the house of
representatives during the 2008 session. See N.M. H.B. 309; S.B. 140, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009). The 2006
Task Force had recommended an appropriation of $1,000,000. See supra text accompanying note 49.
86. See Governor Richardson, New Mexico State of the State Address (Jan. 20, 2009) (on file with
author).
87. See New Mexico Legislature, S.B. 140: State Ethics Commission Act, http://www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/
_session.aspx?chamber=S&legtype=B&legno=%20140&year=09 (last visited Dec. 30, 2009); see also N.M.
S.B. 140.
88. See H.B. 151 & 614, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009).
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nal violations of the New Mexico Election Code and Campaign Act, tampering
with evidence, and embezzlement.89 His father (a former public regulation commission commissioner) was also indicted for violations of the election code and tampering with evidence.90 These new state indictments spurred journalists to call for
reconsideration of the ethics commission proposal.91 “Supporters [said] such a
commission, equipped with subpoena power, would be charged to root out such
misdeeds.”92 In fact, this assertion is misleading, as will become apparent in the
following parts of this note. An ethics commission would not root out such deeds.
In fact, the commission, as proposed, would immediately turn over any complaint
that appeared criminal in nature to the appropriate, established, agency (the district attorney, attorney general, or secretary of state, depending upon the violation).93 Further, even if such criminal acts were within the scope of an ethics
commission’s jurisdiction, it is questionable whether such a commission would
likely, or best, “root out” such activity.
III. HOUSE BILL 151
For the purposes of focusing on an ethics commission proposal that was recently
close to becoming law, Part III reviews House Bill 151, creating a “state ethics
commission act.”94 The New Mexico House of Representatives passed House Bill
151 unanimously in 2009, making it the most recent proposal with such an endorsement.95 The following sections describe an ethics commission as it would exist if
House Bill 151 had been enacted.
A. Ethics Commission: Composition and Administration
The commission would be comprised of seven New Mexico residents; up to four
of the seven commissioners could be from the same political party.96 The governor
would appoint three of the seven commissioners.97 In addition, the president pro
tempore of the senate, the minority floor leader of the senate, the speaker of the
house, and the minority floor leader of the house would each appoint one commis-

89. See State v. Block, No. D101CR200900138 (Apr. 8, 2009) (certificate finding probable cause).
90. See id.
91. New Mexico Attorney General’s Office investigations into state housing authority operations and
authority use of federal elections funds, combined with a federal inquiry into Richardson administration business practices, were cited as reason to enact ethics commission legislation. Trip Jennings, Block Scandal Adds
to Pressure on New Mexico Democrats, N.M. INDEP., Apr. 9, 2009, available at http://newmexicoindependent.
com/24458/block-scandal-adds-to-pressure-on-nm-democrats.
92. Id. (referring to the most recent scandals).
93. See infra Part III.
94. See H.B. 151 & 614, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. § 1 (N.M. 2009).
95. See New Mexico Legislature, Bill Locator, http://www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/_locatorcom.aspx?year=09
(last visited Dec. 28, 2009); see also N.M. H.B. 151 & 614.
96. See N.M. H.B. 151 & 614 § 3(A), (B)(1)–(2).
97. No more than two governor appointees would be from the same political party, and at least one
would be from each of New Mexico’s three congressional districts. See id. § 3(A)(1). Initially the proposal
provided for even distribution from New Mexico Public Regulation Commission districts. See H.B. 8, 48th
Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (N.M. 2007) (creating an ethics commission). One governor appointee would be chosen
from a list of five recommended persons, not from the governor’s political party, put forth by the house and
senate floor leaders. See N.M. H.B. 151 & 614 § 3(A)(1).
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sioner.98 The commissioners would serve up to two, four-year terms.99 New Mexico
residents who changed their party affiliation would be ineligible for membership
on the commission for one year.100 Commission decisions would require four concurring commissioner votes, including two votes from each of the largest political
parties represented.101
The seven appointed commissioners would serve as a governing board for a
commission administrative staff that would carry out the commission’s day-to-day
functions. At the least, the commission would have to hire an executive director.102
The director could then hire a general counsel and other staff.103 House Bill 151 as
passed, however, did not include funding for any salaries or other commission
expenses.104
B. Personal and Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
House Bill 151 defined the commission’s jurisdiction broadly. Commission oversight would include state officials, state employees, government contractors, and
lobbyists.105 Of particular note, “state officials” and “state employees,” were defined, respectively, as the elected and appointed officials within all three government branches and the employees of all three government branches.106 The
commission would receive complaints about “ethics violations.” The ethics violations, as defined by House Bill 151, are analogous to “subject matter” jurisdiction
for the commission.107 Ethics violations could include violations of ethics codes
drafted by the commission,108 and would include violations of existing New Mexico
statutes, including the gift act, governmental conduct act, procurement code, lobbyist regulation act, financial disclosure act (campaign practices act), campaign reporting act, and voter action sections of the election code.109

98. See N.M. H.B. 151 & 614 § 3(A)(2)–(5). There were numerous iterations of proposed appointing
agents and appointee distribution mechanisms to create a commission membership that would represent the
state and minimize politicization. See Ethics Commission Questionnaire as filled out by 2007 Task Force Members, Suellyn Scarnnechia, Garrey Curruthers, William McCamley, and Norman Thayer (on file with author).
99. See N.M. H.B. 151 & 614 § 3(C). After initial appointments, the commissioners would draw lots to
determine staggered terms such that four commissioners would serve full four-year terms. Three commissioners would serve three-year terms, and three would serve two-year terms. Id. If a vacancy occurred, the replacement would be named by the person in the same position as the position held by the person who appointed the
previous commissioner. Id. § 3(G).
100. See id. § 3(B)(2).
101. See id. § 3(F). Appointments would be made with “due consideration to achieving geographical
representation from the state.” Id. § 3(B)(3).
102. See id. § 4(A)(6).
103. See id. § 5(B).
104. See generally N.M. H.B. 151 & 614.
105. See generally id.
106. See id. § 2(L), (M).
107. Subject mater jurisdiction is: “Jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought;
the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 931 (9th ed. 2009).
108. N.M. H.B. 151 § 2(C). These codes would be subject to state-agency approval and thus might, or
might not, come to fruition if House Bill 151 were enacted. Id. § 4(A)(4).
109. See id. § 2(C) (referencing the listed acts: NMSA 1978, §§ 10-16-B-1 to -4 (2007) (gift act); NMSA
1978, §§ 10-16-1 to -18 (1967, as amended through 2009) (government conduct act); NMSA 1978, §§ 13-1-21 to
-47 (1984, as amended through 2005) (procurement code); NMSA 1978, 2-11-2 to -9 (1977, as amended
through 2005) (lobbyist regulation act); NMSA 1978, §§ 10-16A-1 to -8 (1993, as amended through 1997)
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C. Duties
House Bill 151 divided commission activities into duties and powers.110 Duties
would be the commission’s mandatory activities, while powers would be discretionary.111 The commission’s first duty, as mentioned above, would be to hire an executive director.112 The prescribed director’s activities were similarly divided by House
Bill 151 into duties and powers.113 The director would perform investigations as
directed, bring complaints and investigation results before the commission, prepare the commission’s annual budget, and make recommendations to the commission regarding rules or legislative changes.114 The commission would receive
complaints of alleged ethics violations and direct investigations of those complaints;115 keep confidential all advisory opinion requests and solicitors;116 report
findings of ethical violations supported by clear and convincing evidence;117 maintain publicly accessible advisory opinions, complaints, and reports;118 and compose
an executive branch code of ethics—which would require adoption by each independently elected executive official before application by the commission.119 The
commission would also enact recusal rules for its own members,120 and it would
enact procedural rules for administration of the state ethics commission act, including hearing and meeting rules.121 Finally, the commission would submit annual
legislative recommendations to the leaders of each government branch.122
D. Powers
The commission would have the power, but not the duty, to initiate complaints,
issue advisory opinions, reprimand, promulgate ethics guides, and provide ethics
training. While the commission would be required to receive, and either dismiss or
investigate, ethics violation complaints from outside individuals, it could also
choose to initiate ethics complaints itself.123 The commission could also decide

(financial disclosure act); NMSA 1978, §§ 1-19-1 to -36 (1967, as amended through 2007) (campaign practices
act); NMSA 1978, §§ 1-1-1 to -24 (1969, as amended through 2008) (election code)).
110. See generally N.M. H.B. 151 & 614.
111. See id.
112. See id. § 4(A)(6).
113. See id. § 5.
114. See id. § 5(A)(2)–(6).
115. The commission would investigate violations committed by state officials, employees, government
contractors, and lobbyists. See id. § 4(A)(1).
116. Some circumstances specifically provide for disclosure. See id. § 9.
117. The commission would make reports to the violating individual’s employer, appropriate state
agency, appointing authority, or other appropriate body. Id. § 4A(2). As defined in House Bill 151, state
agencies would include all departments, commissions, councils, boards, committees, institutions, agencies government corporations, educational institutions, and elected officials from the three branches of state government. See id. § 2(K). There are over 200 such agencies. See NMSA 1978, Executive Agency Index (2009).
118. See N.M. H.B. 151 & 614 § 4(A)(3).
119. See id. § 4(A)(4). These independently elected executive officers include the governor, attorney
general, state auditor, and state treasurer. See N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1.
120. See N.M. H.B. 151 & 614 § 4(A)(8).
121. See id. § 4(A)(5).
122. See id. § 4(A)(7).
123. See id. § 4(B)(1). It is not clear whether the commissioners would be required to vote on the issue
of whether to file a given complaint on the commission’s behalf, or whether a single commissioner could file a
complaint on behalf of the commission. The commission chairperson, however, would “sign” the complaint.
See id. § 7(C).
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whether to issue advisory opinions, and whether to make public reprimands, censures, or recommendations of disciplinary action, for parties under commission jurisdiction.124 The commission could subpoena, requiring a witness to attend a
hearing or the production of books and other documents, through a petition to the
district court.125 The commission could also take on an educational role by drafting
governmental and business ethics guides, or by providing ethics training.126
The director would have powers supportive to the commission. The director
could hire a general counsel and other “personnel as may be necessary.”127 The
director could also take depositions and administer oaths, as limited by district
court discovery rules.128
E. Staged Enablement
The ethics commission would be enabled in two stages.129 In the first year of
enactment, commissioners would be appointed; then the commission would hire a
director and staff, promulgate rules, write ethics codes, make recommendations for
future oversight of local government, and it could provide ethics education.130 In its
second year, the commission could begin issuing advisory opinions, receiving complaints, investigating complaints, making evidentiary findings, and recommending
penalties.131
F. Advisory Opinions, Complaints, and Investigations
House Bill 151 included guidelines for how the commission should handle issuing advisory opinions, responding to complaints, and conducting investigations.
Advisory opinion requests would have to be written, and would have to include a
description of the “specific set of circumstances involving an ethics issue.”132 The
commission’s advisory opinions would have to be issued within a given time.133
While advisory opinions requests would be confidential, the commission’s opinions
could be publicly released if the requestor’s name were omitted.134
Ethics complaints could come to the commission in one of two ways. The commissioners could file complaints themselves, or the commission could receive complaints from persons with “actual knowledge” of an ethics violation.135 If a
complaint were filed “by the commission,” the director would file the complaint
and include specific charges with factual support.136 Other complainants would

124. See id. §§ 4(B)(2), (4). The advisory opinions could bind the commission in any future dealings with
the opinion solicitor. The advisory opinions would be binding if the commission did not amend or revoke the
opinion, and if the solicitor acted in “good faith and reliance upon the opinion.” See id. § 6(A).
125. See id. § 4(B)(3).
126. See id. § 4(B)(5)–(7).
127. Id. § 5(B).
128. Id. § 5(C).
129. See id. § 17(A)–(B).
130. See id. § 17(A).
131. See id. § 17(B). Staged enactment would partially address funding issues. See infra Part IV.
132. See id. § 6(B)(1). Advisory opinion solicitors would have to be state officials, lobbyists, government
contractors, or state employees. See id. § 6(A).
133. See id. § 6(C).
134. See id. § 6(B).
135. Id. § 7(A)(1)–(2).
136. Id. § 7(C).
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have to sign their complaints “under penalty of false statement” and would have to
include specific factual allegations.137 In addition, complainants would need to submit evidence such as documents and witness names.138 Retaliation, or any other
adverse action, against good-faith complainants would be prohibited.139
After receiving a complaint, the director would decide if the allegations fell
within the commission’s jurisdiction, and whether the complaint “warrant[ed] investigation.”140 Regardless of the outcome of the director’s decision, the director
would bring the complaint and recommendation to the commission for action, with
one exception—complaints against judges or justices.141 Those complaints would
be “immediately” referred to the JSC.142 The ethics commission could either accept
the director’s recommendation or dismiss. Complaints could be dismissed if they
were “frivolous, unfounded or outside the [commission’s] jurisdiction.”143
If the commission recommended investigation, the director would investigate
the complaint. The director’s investigation could include depositions of witnesses
under oath,144 subpoenaed documents, or witness testimony.145 District court judges
would hear subpoena challenges in confidential proceedings.146 House Bill 151
would prohibit retaliation or other adverse actions against anyone providing information or materials during an investigation.147
After investigating a complaint, the director would determine if clear and convincing evidence of an ethics violation exists. The director would then notify the
complainant and respondent regarding the complaint disposition.148 The respondent would have the right to legal counsel.149 State officials and employees would
be entitled to representation by the New Mexico General Services Department’s
Risk Management Division.150 Such an employee or official receiving representation would have to reimburse the risk management division for “reasonable attor-

137. Id. § 7(B).
138. Id.
139. Id. § 14(A)(1). There is, however, no provision for enforcement of this prohibition. Id.
140. See id. § 7(D).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. § 7(E).
144. Id. § 7(F).
145. Id. The commission could apply for subpoenas when at least four commissioners concur in the
decision. Id. § 7(G). The subpoena would describe the nature of the investigation, the information required for
production, a deadline and location to produce the information, and the adverse consequences for non-compliance. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 14(A)(2). There is, however, no penalty or mechanism provided to enforce this prohibition.
Id. If a commission meeting were not scheduled within ninety days of receiving a complaint, then the director
would report to the commission the status of investigations. Similarly, if a complaint were not disposed within
twelve months of initiation, the director would report to the commission on the complaint’s status. See id.
§ 13(A). The commission could then decide to either dismiss the complaint, or continue the investigation. Id. If
the investigation continued, the director would have to report the status of the matter every six months, and
notify the respondent of the commission’s action. Id. § 13(A)–(B).
148. Id. § 7(E).
149. Id.
150. The New Mexico General Services Department has a risk management division that provides legal
representation in certain torts claims act lawsuits. See NMSA 1978, §§ 41-4-16 (1977), 15-7-3 (1997); see also
infra Part IV (discussing issues with risk management division involvement in ethics commission
representation).

\\server05\productn\N\NMX\39-3\NMX306.txt

Summer 2009]

unknown

Seq: 15

THE PROPOSED STATE ETHICS COMMISSION ACT

18-JUN-10

11:45

611

ney fees and costs” if the commission were to find the individual indeed committed
an ethics violation.151
Complaints filed with the commission, and records of commission investigations, would be confidential unless otherwise provided.152 A breach of the required
confidentiality would be a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum fine of $1000,
or up to one year imprisonment.153 A civil penalty for breach of confidentiality
could be assessed for up to $25,000 per confidence violation.154
G. Post-Investigation
After an investigation, the director would present a written report of the investigation results to the commission during a closed hearing.155 The commission would
notify the respondent and the respondent’s counsel of the director’s presentation
and would allow them to participate.156 The commission would make a finding at
the hearing as to whether clear and convincing evidence existed that an ethics violation had occurred. The commission would base its decision on the outcome of the
director’s investigation and the facts alleged in the complaint. If the investigated
acts were found to be criminal violations, the commission would refer the matter
to an appropriate district attorney, or the attorney general, along with all of the
documents and evidence that supported the finding.157
If the commission were to decide there was clear and convincing evidence of a
non-criminal ethics violation, the commission would publicly report its findings,
unless the matter was a legislator violation.158 In all cases, the commission would
submit the report and all evidence to the respondent, the attorney general, and to
a party to which the respondent is accountable (the respondent’s “appointing authority,” the appropriate legislative body, the appropriate state agency, or the respondent’s employer).159 If the violation was committed by an executive branch
employee or official, the report could reprimand or censure the person and make
recommendations for discipline.160 If a legislator committed the ethics violation,
the commission would make a public (generic) notice of referral, and confidentially report the investigation resulting in clear and convincing evidence to the appropriate legislative ethics committee.161 Legislative committees would be required
to take action on legislator referrals and would be required to publish some indication of that action.162
151. Id.
152. See id. § 9. Confidentiality would not be protected if the records entered evidence through a judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding; if confidentiality is not permitted by law or court order; or if a
respondent filed a waiver of confidentiality. Id.
153. Id. § 11(A).
154. Id. § 11(B).
155. Id. § 7(H).
156. Id.
157. Id. § 12. The appropriate district attorney is that individual elected to prosecute in the jurisdiction
where the suspected criminal activity occurred. Alternatively, jurisdiction could revert to the 1st Judicial District Attorney of New Mexico. Id.
158. Id. § 7(I), (J).
159. Id. § 7(J)(1)–(4).
160. See id. § 7(I).
161. See id. supra N.M. H.B. 151, § 8(A).
162. See id. § 8(B). Recommendations to the legislature for reprimand, censure, or other action would
be made publicly. Decisions regarding complaints that did not warrant action, and committee members’ votes,
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If the commission decided there was not clear and convincing evidence of an
ethics violation, it would have to dismiss the complaint, report its findings to the
respondent, and keep the report confidential unless the respondent requested that
the commission make the report public.163
H. Restrictions
The commission would be restricted from reviewing certain ethics complaints,
and filing complaints would not be permitted during certain time periods. For example, the commission would be prohibited from investigating misconduct related
to campaign advertising.164 The commission would be prohibited from taking action on complaints filed against candidates for public office between the candidate’s primary election filing date and the day of that candidate’s general election
(dismissal of such a complaint by the commission, however, would be allowed).165
The commission would be required to notify complainants that criminal conduct
should be reported to the attorney general, or appropriate district attorney, rather
than to the ethics commission.166 The commission could only review complaints
regarding conduct that occurred after July 1, 2009.167 In addition, a statute of limitations would require that the conduct alleged in a complaint had occurred within
three years of the complaint filing date.168
I. Conflicts of Interest
House Bill 151 attempted to reduce possible commissioner conflicts of interest.
Under its provisions, commissioners would be required to disqualify themselves
from any proceedings pertaining to the person who appointed them; they would
also be required to disqualify themselves for any other conflict of interest.169 The
commission could disqualify a commissioner if that commissioner’s participation
were questioned due to a conflict of interest.170 If four or more commissioners were
disqualified, the commission could appoint temporary commissioners by a majority
vote.171 During their service with the ethics commission, commissioners and the
commission director would be prohibited from holding or pursuing public office.172
In addition they would be prohibited from accepting appointment to public positions or political party offices.173 Further, commissioners would not be allowed to
accept state employment, contract for their services with the state government, or

would be publicly reported regarding their general nature without disclosure of the legislator’s name. Further
investigations would be reported within ninety days of complaint receipt, and every year following, until a final
decision is made. Id. § 8(C).
163. Id. § 7(K).
164. Id. § 10(C).
165. Id. § 10(B).
166. Id.
167. Id. § 16.
168. See id. § 10(A).
169. Id. § 3(I).
170. Id.
171. Temporary appointments would be in accordance with the geographical and political distinctions
provided for in the original commissioner appointments. Id.
172. Id. §§ 5(D)(1), 3(H)(1).
173. Id. § 3(H)(1).
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lobby the legislature during their commission terms.174 Similarly, the year after
leaving the commission, commissioners and the director would not be allowed to
pursue public office, to accept state employment or appointed public positions, or
to represent respondents in front of the commission (unless they were to appear in
front of the commission on their own behalf).175 Finally, commissioners would be
prohibited from taking employment from, or providing services for, any respondent,176 unless the employment or services were agreed upon before the related
complaint was filed.177
Permanent commissioner removal could only take place for incompetence, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.178 Removal proceedings could only be commenced by the commission, or by the attorney general at the commission’s
request.179 The New Mexico Supreme Court would have sole jurisdiction over commissioner-removal proceedings.180
IV. ETHICS COMMISSION ISSUES
A. Creation of an Ethics Commission Previously Contemplated and Set Aside
The year 2006181 was not the first in which a government committee considered
the creation of an ethics commission in New Mexico.182 In 1992, the “Governmental Ethics Task Force” (1992 Task Force), a committee of New Mexico citizens and
state legislators, also considered such an idea.183 The 1992 Task Force recommended an ethics reform package that was, for the most part, adopted that year.184
After specifically contemplating the creation of an ethics commission, the 1992
Task Force decided not to pursue the creation of such a commission for five explicitly articulated reasons: (1) added bureaucracy with significant expense; (2) existing structures, primarily the secretary of state, were sufficient, with additional
resources and authority; (3) enhanced political responsibility needed a chance to

174. Id. § 3(H)(2).
175. Id. §§ 3(J), 5(D).
176. Respondents would be state officials, employees, government contractors, or lobbyists who are the
subject of a complaint filed with the commission. Id. § 2(J).
177. Id. § 3(J)(3).
178. Id. § 3(G). “Incompetence, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office” is not defined. This language,
however, is the same provided for removal of university boards of regents members, N.M. CONST. art. XII,
§ 13, State Investment Council members, NMSA 1978, § 6-8-3 (1983), economic development commission
commissioners, NMSA 1978, § 9-15-11 (1997), and other boards’ members. New Mexico courts interpret the
removal standard as pertaining only to an individual’s current term of office. Thus, if an individual serves two
consecutive terms of office, they cannot be removed during their second term for acts committed during their
first term of office. See State v. Santillanes, 99 N.M. 89, 91, 654 P.2d 542, 544 (1982). Malfeasance by a public
officer is “acting wholly wrongful and unlawful,” where that action is connected to that officer’s official duties,
and combined with an “evil intent or motive,” with gross negligence equivalent to fraud. 63C AM. JUR. 2D
Public Officers and Employees § 373 (1964).
179. N.M. H.B. 151 & 614 § 3(G).
180. Id.
181. See generally supra Part II.B.
182. See generally GOVERNMENT ETHICS TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT-FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1993).
183. Id. at 1.
184. The package included campaign reporting proposals, the lobbyist regulation act, and conflict of
interest act amendments (including renaming it the government conduct act). Id. at 10–24. James “Bud”
Mulcock and J. John Underwood co-chaired the 1992 Task Force. Id. at 1.
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operate and was a more appropriate option than extra-political processes; 4) an
independent commission could be a source for further conflict and divisiveness,
undermining public confidence; and 5) separation of powers precluded delegation
to one administering body.185 The 1992 Task Force chose to focus, rather, on laws
being “sound, workable, understandable and properly enforced.”186 While, arguably, some of the concerns the 1992 Task Force cited may no longer apply, they
were not formally addressed by any of the more recent ethics commission
proposals.187
B. House Bill 151 Weaknesses
Thirteen years after the 1992 Task Force decided not to pursue creating an ethics commission, the idea resurfaced with greater interest, as demonstrated by the
2006 Task Force recommendations.188 The newly proposed commission, however,
would face even more issues than those foreseen in 1993. This Part identifies five
weaknesses of an ethics commission as proposed in House Bill 151.189 First, the
commission was proposed without identifying the state’s needs. Thus House Bill
151 was not crafted to address specific problems (other than public perceptions),
but was rather intended to address everything, generally, and thus likely ineffectively. Second, House Bill 151 was not adequately funded. The commission would
have substantial direct, and indirect, financial impacts that should be considered.
Third, the commission’s jurisdictional scope would be unconstitutionally broad
under New Mexico’s separation of power protections. Fourth, many proposed
commission responsibilities are already held by other government agencies, and
such redundancy could hinder rather than strengthen those agencies’ ethics oversight. Finally, while retaliation or other adverse actions against complainants and
informants would be prohibited, House Bill 151 did not provide penalties or other
protections to enforce its bare assertion of prohibition.190
C. House Bill 151 Was Not Tailored to Address a Known Problem
Enacting House Bill 151 in the name of ethics reform would have been like a
doctor applying a bandage to a tender lump that has not yet been diagnosed. The
bandage would create the appearance that medical action was taken, and the
“treatment” would cost less than the potentially more-appropriate chemotherapy.
It is possible the bandage would help heal the inflammation, or that bandaging was
the exact treatment the painful protuberance needed. Unfortunately, however,
without a proper diagnosis and treatment based on the findings of that diagnosis,
the lump could become more insidious, and it would be hidden while it festered.
A push to study and propose solutions, before assessing the underlying
problems, crippled both the 2006 and 2007 task forces before they even began their

185. Id. at 8–9.
186. Id. at 9.
187. The 1992 Task Force concerns may have been considered informally. Whether that may have happened is not known.
188. See supra Part II.B.
189. Some of these weaknesses would be shared amongst all proposed ethics commissions while other
weaknesses are specific to House Bill 151.
190. See supra notes 139, 147 and accompanying text.
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work. Richardson directed his task force members to “study the issues of governmental ethics and campaign finance reform . . . includ[ing] . . . [making a] review
of current . . . laws and [regulations].”191 He asserted that “strong ethics and campaign finance laws are essential building blocks in forming an effective state government,” and that it is essential that the public have the “utmost confidence in
their government and that [the government] works exclusively to advance the best
interests of the people of New Mexico.”192
Based on the vague directive to “study” ethics reform, and the ambiguous goals
of “utmost public confidence” and “strong” ethics laws, the 2006 and 2007 task
forces, understandably, proceeded to adopt methodologies that skipped a diagnosis and went straight to comparing and selecting possible statutory treatments.
They sought a bandage for a nameless infection, manifested by symptoms of extortion, kickbacks, and embezzlement.193 Further, they needed to address Richardson’s fear of negative public perception due to “weak” laws. Recommendations
were based on: a comparison of New Mexico’s statutory and administrative ethics
provisions with those of other states; task force discussions, and presentations
about other states’ ethics infrastructures.194 Given such a strategy, the creation of
an ethics commission was an obvious inclusion in the package of recommendations
that resulted, particularly since forty other states either already had a commission,
or were in the process of implementing such a commission.195 Whether the ethicscommission bandages applied in other states had effectively treated those states’
underlying lesions was not considered. Similarly, whether New Mexico’s inflamed
lump was an illness related to ethical illnesses treated elsewhere by an ethics-commission bandage was not contemplated.
Because of the flawed methodology applied to New Mexico’s elusive ethics disease, the 2006 and 2007 task forces proclaimed aspirational, rather than curative,
“justifications” for creating a commission. A commission would “promote increased accountability for ethical behavior among state officials and employees,
lobbyists and those that conduct business with the state, . . . [it would] encourage
the reporting of ethics violations and protect the rights of those that file such reports,” and “serve as a deterrent for unethical practices in state government.”196
These assertions are analogous with predicting that a bandage applied to an undiagnosed lump would “comfort the sick, reduce swelling, and deter dangerous
physical activities.” While the assertions might or might not have been true, the
aspirations expressed do not necessarily address underlying problems, nor are the
evils proclaimed as remedied known to exist. Along the same lines, additional task
force aspirations for the commission included making appointing authorities aware
of the unethical practices of their appointees such that the appointees might be
removed, and making state officials more knowledgeable as to what constitutes
ethical behavior through ethics training. No findings were made as to whether such
governmental authorities are unaware of their appointees’ unethical practices; no

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

2006 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 4, at 3.
See N.M. Exec. Order 2006-021a (May 30, 2006) (on file with author).
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 39, 62 (discussing 2006 and 2007 task force methodology).
See supra note 18; see also appendices 3 and 4.
See 2007 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 62, at 9.
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findings were made that state officials lack knowledge of existing ethical rules.
Further, no research showed the implementation of a commission would remedy
an existing problem of authorities’ awareness of ethics violations or their knowledge of ethical practices. Finally, no correlation was documented between government authorities’ improved ethics knowledge and an improved political culture in
New Mexico.
The fact that New Mexico is one of only ten states without an ethics commission, for some, is reason enough to justify implementing one.197 This logic, however, is flawed. If there were evidence that ethics commissions changed the
political culture in other states, and that those states had the same problems as
New Mexico prior to the implementation of their ethics commissions, that conclusion might make sense.198 The task forces, however, did not review data suggesting
a known prevalence of non-criminal acts that would constitute “ethics violations”
(such data did not exist).199 Thus, they did not diagnose New Mexico’s ailment.
There is no indication that a new commission with oversight of existing statutes—
statutes with existing enforcement provisions—would provide greater deterrence
than already exists for individuals breaking the law. Therefore, the Task Forces did
not treat New Mexico’s known symptoms. The relative level of state officials’
awareness of what constitutes ethical behavior under existing acts was not known.
Thus, the commission would treat symptoms that may or may not exist in New
Mexico.
Whether an ethics commission is part of an appropriate treatment plan to address New Mexico’s government scandals is impossible to say since the problems it
seeks to address have never been diagnosed. Whatever the true disease may be,
however, the ethics commission as proposed would not directly address the visible
symptoms, primarily high-profile, criminal corruption.200 Without a clearly identified baseline from which to work, the commission’s success or failure would be
doomed to ambiguity, resources would be wasted, and more productive options
would be neglected.
D. Inadequate Funding
House Bill 151 did not provide funding for an ethics commission’s direct and
indirect financial impacts. Several proposals preceding House Bill 151 (including
an earlier version of House Bill 151) did provide operational funding for the direct
financial needs of a commission. An ethics commission’s indirect financial impact,
however, has never been accounted for in any known proposal, nor was it considered in either task force’s recommendation. The amount of recurring (operating)
funding included in House Bill 151, none, would be insufficient to allow the proposed commission to fulfill its proposed mandatory and discretionary roles.201 The

197. See generally Jennings, Tougher Ethics Supported, supra note 8, at A1; Editorial, Our View: Legislators Need Ethics Reform, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Apr. 3, 2007, at A5.
198. There are other considerations as well, such as whether the commission would achieve any functions not already accomplished through existing governmental agencies. See infra Part IV.F.
199. See supra note 39.
200. See generally supra Part II.
201. A $250,000 budget could include salaries for an executive director and a general counsel with salaries of $75,000 and $60,000 respectively, benefits and other employment costs for approximately $45,000, and
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$250,000 included in the 2008 bill that passed the house of representatives,202 and
the $500,000 dollars included in the 2007 Task Force recommendation, would also
likely fall short of the proposed agency’s needed budget, despite the recommendation by the department of finance and administration for $500,000.203
In order to function—even minimally—the commission would need a recurring
operational budget.204 The commission’s minimum requirements would be hiring a
director, drafting ethics codes, receiving advisory opinion requests and complaints,
and holding meetings. Thus, at the very least, the commission would need funding
for one director’s salary and benefits, storage, an office, office supplies, and travel
budgets for the commissioners.
To be fully operational, the commission would need the ability to use its discretionary powers as well.205 The commission’s director would need to hire other employees such as administrative staff, investigator(s), and a general counsel. The
commission would likely exercise its power to investigate complaints, engage in
legal research for advisory opinions, and hold hearings. The commission might also
decide to engage in its optional educational role by publishing manuals and hosting
trainings. The investigations would require either an investigator, or contractual
services for investigations, and additional travel funding for the person(s) investigating complaints. The legal research and opinion writing tasks would require
trained personnel and legal resources. If the commission were to sponsor ethics
trainings, it would need funding for additional supplies and contractual services, as
well as funding for dedicated staff for those purposes. If the commission were to
decide to publish ethics manuals, it would need funding for publications contracts,
and it would need additional funding for research, preparation, and drafting.206
The New Mexico General Services Department Risk Management Division
would bear the primary indirect financial impact from the commission.207 The risk
management division is the agency that would be tasked with providing counsel for
government actors accused of ethics violations under House Bill 151.208 If the ethics commission were implemented as proposed in that bill, the risk management
division would have to represent a whole new class of individuals, and the agency
would likely need additional resources in order to do so. In the realm of the federal government, representation of government employees during investigations,

contractual investigation services, office space, audit, etc. for $60,000, leaving $10,000 for supplies. A lesser
amount would easily result in an under-funded agency from its inception.
202. See H.B. 309, 48th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2008).
203. See supra note 69.
204. See infra Part III.C. (describing the duties the ethics commission would be required to accomplish
under House Bill 151).
205. See supra Part III.D. (discussing the optional, but central, “powers” delegated to the ethics commission under House Bill 151).
206. The commission would need to research mechanisms used by state-government contractors, and
research state-government business climate and processes, in order to draft the “business ethics guide” suggested in House Bill 151. See supra Part III.D.
207. This assumption is based on the explicit House Bill 151 provision assigning the risk management
division to provide representation for certain government employees accused of ethics violations. See supra
Part.III.F. It is also possible that any agency or government branch whose officials are under investigation by
the ethics commission would be indirectly financially impacted in that it could not fully function during the
investigation. The risk management division, however, would be systematically impacted as the agency tapped
for ethics commission defense counsel duties.
208. See supra Part III.F.
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hearings, and prosecutions, has proved very costly for both the government and
the individuals.209 Another indirect expense created by a commission would be the
time and resources that would be lost when state actors are wrongly accused, and
when indirectly associated employees, contractors, lobbyists, and other government actors take part in commission investigations and hearings about their colleagues’ alleged behavior.
E. Separation of Powers Issues
1. Analyzing Separation of Powers Issues Under the New Mexico
Constitution
House Bill 151 risks violating the separation of powers protections provided in
the New Mexico Constitution because it would give an ethics commission multibranch personal jurisdiction.210 The New Mexico Constitution provides that powers
of the state are divided into “three distinct departments.”211 This provision reflects
a principle “fundamental to the structure of the federal government and the governments of all fifty states,” the goal of preventing any one branch from accumulating too much power, and threatening liberty.212 Persons and groups “charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments” are
prohibited from exercising powers belonging to one of the other branches, except
as provided expressly in the New Mexico Constitution.213
New Mexico courts find constitutional infringements when one government
branch “unduly ‘interfer[es] with or encroach[es] on the authority or within the
province of’ a coordinate branch of government.”214 The New Mexico Supreme
Court is guided in its separation of powers analysis by the structure of the federal
government; the legislative, judicial, and executive powers are not “‘hermetically
sealed,’” but still are “‘functionally identifiable.’”215 Absolute separation of functions is not the meaning of separation of powers, and has been recognized as
“neither desirable nor realistic.”216 Rather, an unconstitutional infringement of
separation of powers occurs when the “‘action by one branch prevents another
from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned function.’”217
In a given separation of powers case, the court first identifies which branch of
the government is acting.218 Then the court determines whether the act in question

209. See generally Kathleen Clark, Paying the Price for Heightened Ethics Scrutiny: Legal Defense Funds
and Other Ways that Government Officials Pay Their Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 65 (1997).
210. See supra Part III.B. While the commission, under House Bill 151, would receive complaints regarding all three branches’ officials and employees, it would refer judicial complaints to the JSC, and would
refer legislator-investigation results to the appropriate legislative committee. Legislative committees would
then be required to act in response to commission referrals. See supra Part III.B.
211. N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1.
212. State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 573, 904 P.2d 11, 22 (1995) (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991)).
213. N.M. CONST. art III, § 1.
214. Clark, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22 (citations omitted).
215. Id. (quoting I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
216. Id.
217. See State ex rel. N.M. Judicial Standards Comm’n v. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, ¶ 12, 73 P.3d 197,
201 (quoting State ex. rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015, ¶ 13, 125 N.M. 343, 961 P.2d 768).
218. Sometimes determining to which branch an actor belongs can be straightforward. See Clark, 120
N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22 (in which the actor was the governor, and was obviously part of the executive
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embodies the power of another branch.219 Finally, the court analyzes whether the
act potentially “disrupts the proper balance” between the two government
branches.220 If there is not a disruption of the proper balance, then there is not a
constitutional separation of powers violation. Conversely, if there is a disruption of
the proper balance, there might be a constitutional violation. The ultimate question becomes whether a disruption is “undue.”221 The New Mexico Supreme Court
has found an undue disruption when an action by one branch is foreclosed by
another in an area in which the first branch’s authority is undisputed.222
2. An Ethics Commission Would Be Part of the Executive Branch
The classification of the ethics commission, as outlined in House Bill 151, into
one of the three state government branches is not clear on the face of the bill.223
Because the New Mexico Constitution provides that “[t]he powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments,” the commission
would have to belong to one of the three branches. It could not belong to all three
branches, nor could it represent its own branch, despite assertions it would be “independent.”224 Without enabling language enacted through a constitutional
amendment, the commission would not be constitutionally designated as part of
one branch. Such constitutional language is used to explicitly designate to which
government branch some other state agencies belong.225 Looking to the appointing
authority of the commission for guidance in commission classification is not determinative because both the governor and legislative leaders would appoint commissioners.226 Also, House Bill 151 explicitly provides that commission authority
would reach employees and public officials from all three branches of the New
Mexico government.227
Comparing the proposed ethics commission with the JSC, the New Mexico state
agency most similar to an ethics commission, provides guidance as to the appropriate ethics-commission taxonomy. The New Mexico Supreme Court recognizes the
JSC as a “creature of the judicial branch,” despite the governor’s power to appoint
commissioners.228 The court has classified the JSC as part of the judiciary because
the JSC was created by constitutional enabling provisions in the “judicial department,” and because the JSC purpose is investigating members of the judiciary.229

branch). It can also be less obvious, for example in Espinosa, in which the court had to determine to what
branch the JSC belonged. See Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, ¶ 13, 73 P.3d at 201.
219. See Clark, 120 N.M. at 573–74, 904 P.2d at 22–23.
220. Id. at 574, 904 P.2d at 23 (citations omitted).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See generally H.B. 151 & 614, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009).
224. It may be argued that the commission as proposed in 2008 would not be as independent as other
proposals would be due to its requirement to request subpoenas through the attorney general. See supra Part
III for a description of the 2006 Task Force recommendation. See also Moore & Kerns, supra note 21 (summarizing how other states describe their respective commissions).
225. See, N.M. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, & 14; see also N.M. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 13, 28 & 32.
226. See supra Part III. Previous versions of the bill proposed commissioner appointments from all three
branches. See H.B. 309, 48th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2008).
227. See supra Part III.B.
228. State ex rel. N.M. Judicial Standards Comm’n v. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, ¶¶ 8–9, 73 P.3d 197,
200.
229. Id. ¶ 9, 73 P.3d at 200.
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House Bill 151 would not create constitutional enabling provisions, nor would it
limit the ethics commission’s investigation powers to members of one government
branch. The court’s JSC classification is helpful, however, because it teaches that
appointing authority shared with an executive branch official is not a controlling
factor in classifying state agencies. The court’s analysis also teaches the use of a
multi-factor approach for classification.
Because an ethics commission would have to belong to one branch if created, it
should be considered part of the executive branch. This conclusion is based on a
multi-factor analysis. First, a majority of individuals over whom the commission
would have jurisdiction are members of the executive branch.230 Second, the manner in which the commission would function is similar to executive branch administrative agencies because it would have the power to make and enforce rules.231
Third, in at least one ethics commission proposal, an executive branch officer, the
attorney general, would have had an ongoing special relationship with the commission through the requirement that he or she authorize subpoenas.232 Finally, the
commission would investigate violations of statutes that are currently administered
by executive branch officials.233
3. Judicial Branch Infringement
Assuming an ethics commission would belong to the executive branch,234 the
commission’s enabling statute, and commission’s acts, must not unconstitutionally
infringe upon judicial branch powers.235 For the purposes of examining an “enabling statute,” House Bill 151 provisions will be considered here. Because the commission’s identity as part of the executive branch has been established,236 the next
step of the separation of powers analysis is determining whether commission powers and duties would embody the powers of another branch.237 For the purpose of
determining whether an ethics commission would infringe upon the judicial
branch, this section addresses judicial powers. The third step in the separation of
powers analysis is determining if the commission’s enabling statute, or commission’s actions, would disrupt the proper balance between the executive and judicial
branches.238 If the commission would cause a disruption then it shall not be “undue,” or the action causing the disruption would be unconstitutional under the
separation of powers doctrine.239
230. There are 19,826 state classified employees and at least an additional 425 exempt executive employees. The New Mexico Legislature has 176 full-time employees; the New Mexico Judiciary has 2055. See STATE
PERSONNEL OFFICE CLASSIFIED SERVICE COMPENSATION REPORT 2008 (2008). This conclusion does not take
into account, however whether the majority of the complaints would be about executive branch members.
That factor is unknown. There is no basis upon which to speculate about from which branch the majority of
complaints would arise. In order to make such an estimate, further information about the non-criminal ethics
problems among the proposed population for commission oversight would be necessary.
231. See supra Part III.C.
232. See H.B. 309, 48th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2008) (as passed by the New Mexico House of
Representatives).
233. See supra Part III.B.
234. The same argument would apply if the commission were part of the legislative branch.
235. See supra Part IV.E.1.
236. See supra Part IV.E.2.
237. See supra Part IV.E.1.
238. See supra Part IV.E.1.
239. See supra Part IV.E.1.
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a. Judicial Powers
House Bill 151 provides for an ethics commission that would embody judicial
powers. In order to reach this conclusion, a brief overview of judicial powers as
construed constitutionally, statutorily, and through caselaw is appropriate. The
New Mexico Constitution assigns the state’s judicial power to the New Mexico
Supreme Court, court of appeals, district courts, probate courts, magistrate courts,
and inferior courts created by law.240 Also as per constitutional decree, the supreme court has superintending control over all inferior courts.241 It “may appoint
and remove at pleasure its reporter, bailiff, clerk and such other officers and assistants as may be prescribed by law.”242 The supreme court’s “superintending control” over all lower courts includes administrative matters, as well as maintenance
of public confidence in the administration of justice and the judiciary.243 The fact
that the director of the administrative office of the courts is subject to removal by
the supreme court, in combination with the fact that the director “supervises all
matters relating to administration of the courts,” provides conclusive evidence that
the supreme court has “ultimate authority over administrative matters.”244 As per
statute, the state courts provide administration over all the judicial employees.245
In addition to the state’s courts, the JSC also defines the character of the judicial branch. The JSC is empowered to discipline or remove any justice, judge, or
magistrate for “willful misconduct in office, persistent failure or inability to perform a judge’s duties, or habitual intemperance.”246 By constitutional decree, the
JSC receives and keeps confidential complaints filed; investigates complaints about
judges, justices, and magistrates; holds hearings; and makes recommendations regarding JSC findings to the supreme court.247 Although the JSC is recognized as
playing no role in the judicial functions of construing law and rendering judgments,248 its creation as part of the judicial branch caused “the functions of the
[JSC] itself” to become judicial functions.249
Against the preceding constitutional, statutory, and caselaw backdrop, the ethics commission envisioned by House Bill 151 would clearly embody judicial powers. The power to receive and adjudicate complaints about judges,250 and the power

240. The constitution also gives the power to the New Mexico Senate “when sitting as a court of impeachment.” N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
241. Id. § 3.
242. Id. § 9.
243. This finding was a corollary to the finding that a justice of the New Mexico judiciary was acting
within his constitutionally granted judicial powers when he ordered the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court
to terminate its court administrator. See Rusillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1173–74 (1991) (citing State v.
Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 411, 60 P.2d 646, 660 (1936); N.M. ex rel. Anaya v. Scarborough, 75 N.M. 702, 706, 410 P.2d
732, 734 (1966)).
244. Id. at 1174 (citing NMSA 1978, §§ 34-9-1, -3(A)).
245. New Mexico Court of Appeals employees “serve at the pleasure of the court,” and “perform duties
as provided by the court of appeals.” NMSA 1978, § 34-5-5(A), (D) (1966). District court employees are
similarly provided for by law, as are metropolitan court employees, magistrate court employees, and administrative office of the courts employees. See NMSA 1978, § 34-6-19 (1968); § 34-8A-7 (1980); § 34-9-1 (1959);
§ 34-9-2 (1959); § 34-7-10 (1979).
246. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32.
247. Id.
248. State ex rel. N.M. Judicial Standards Comm’n v. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, ¶ 13, 73 P.3d 197, 201.
249. Id. ¶ 14, 73 P.3d at 201.
250. See supra Part III.C.
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to investigate judicial employees and make recommendations to the appropriate
supervising authority (the New Mexico Supreme Court or other judicial agency),
are judicial in nature because they are JSC and court functions, explicitly defined
in the New Mexico Constitution, or because the New Mexico Supreme Court has
identified them as such.251 The commission’s employee-oversight and code-drafting
functions would attempt to administer judicial personnel matters, as well as influence the public confidence in the administration of justice and the judiciary, both
functions recognized as judicial.252 Similarly, the release of advisory opinions to the
courts would assume part of the supreme court’s judicial function to provide superintending control over the lower courts.253 The commission’s power to draft a judicial code of ethics, and its power to release advisory opinions regarding the
conduct of judges, are judicial as well, in that these powers are mechanisms for
providing “superintending control,” and therefore they are properly under the supreme court’s purview.
b. Judicial Encroachment
Because House Bill 151 would create an ethics commission that would embody
judicial powers, the next questions within the separation of powers analysis are
whether those functions would encroach upon the judicial branch, and whether the
encroachment would be an undue disruption.254 Based on a comparison with New
Mexico precedent addressing such questions, the commission’s proscribed powers
and duties would unduly encroach upon the judiciary. When the governor removed
six of eleven JSC commissioners, Espinosa held that no encroachment on the judicial branch had occurred. The petitioners in that case challenged the JSC commissioners’ removal as an unconstitutional infringement of the executive branch into
the realm of the judicial branch.255 The supreme court asserted, however, that “[a]n
actual attempt to influence the actions of the [JSC] would be an attempt to control
the judiciary and, therefore, a violation of separations of powers.”256 The court
reasoned that because the constitution intentionally gave the governor the appointing power for the majority of JSC commissioners, the executive power did not
increase if the governor replaced the commissioners he was already constitutionally authorized to appoint.257 The court further reasoned that, because the JSC
works in secret, the governor could not interfere with an ongoing investigation,
and as such there was a check on his potential abuse of power.258
Unlike the situation described in Espinosa, the ethics commission’s powers and
duties relating to judicial oversight would attempt to control the judiciary, without
any constitutional grant of power to do so, and without any check on that power.
The first example of this attempt to control the judiciary is the power the commission would have to receive complaints, investigate, and make recommendations to

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See supra notes 249, 241 and accompanying text.
See supra note 243.
See supra note 241.
See supra Part IV.E.1.
Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, ¶ 15, 73 P.3d at 201.
Id. ¶ 16, 73 P.3d at 201.
Id. ¶ 15, 73 P.3d at 201.
Id.
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the supreme court regarding judicial branch employees. These acts would encroach
upon constitutionally protected judicial powers of the supreme court to “appoint
and remove at pleasure” its employees and to administer and oversee the lower
courts.259 The judiciary’s constitutionally protected powers in this realm are not
tempered by a constitutional assertion of executive involvement, as was the case in
Espinosa.260 Further, the government conduct act specifically provides that complaints against judicial branch employees may be filed and reviewed pursuant to
the procedures provided in the judicial personnel rules, avoiding involvement of
any executive or legislative actors.261 This is an indication that the type of conflict
that would be established by a commission with judicial oversight was purposefully
avoided previously. The judicial branch personnel rules were adopted by the New
Mexico Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional decree of superintending
control, and provide for making complaints against judicial employees for twentyeight activities, from violations of state laws, to “acting in a manner that reflects
poorly upon the integrity of the Judicial Branch.”262 The rules provide procedures
for receiving complaints and holding informal hearings.263 An executive procedure
for the same purpose would only frustrate the supreme court’s constitutionally
granted administrative and oversight powers.
The ethics commission would also attempt to control the judiciary by receiving
complaints regarding judges’ conduct. In contrast to the inconsequential effect on
the balance of powers in Espinosa, when the governor removed JSC commissioners he already appointed, commission receipt of complaints would create a valve
on the flow of complaints about judges, and thus could have a substantial effect on
the intended balance between the branches. The ethics commission would have to
affirmatively refer the complaints it received about judges to the JSC. Unlike the
safeguard against indiscretion pointed to in Espinosa as a check on balance of
powers infringement, the ethics commission initiative in referring judge complaints, or its lack thereof, would not have an integrated check provided by another branch.264 The referral responsibility could cause judicial branch dependence
upon the commission to refer complaints. The JSC currently receives judge complaints directly as the body vested, constitutionally, with the power to receive
them.265 Papers filed with the JSC are constitutionally provided as confidential.266
Ironically, filing complaints about judges with the ethics commission (as part of the
executive branch) would entirely defeat the Espinosa-asserted check against exec-

259. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
261. NMSA 1978, § 10-16-14(D) (1993) (“Complaints against executive branch employees may be filed
with the agency head and reviewed pursuant to the procedures provided in the Personnel Act. Complaints
against legislative branch employees may be filed with and reviewed pursuant to procedures adopted by the
New Mexico legislative council. Complaints against judicial branch employees may be filed and reviewed pursuant to the procedures provided in the judicial personnel rules.”).
262. SUPREME COURT OF N.M., JUDICIAL BRANCH PERSONNEL RULES 60–62 (2005).
263. Id.
264. The JSC was the judicial actor in Espinosa; the governor was the executive actor. Espinosa, 2003NMSC-017, ¶ 15, 73 P.3d at 201. House Bill 151 did include provisions requiring confidentiality by the commission and the executive actor, but those provisions would not provide a check upon the commission’s power to
act as a valve.
265. See N.M. CONST. art. 6, § 32.
266. Id.
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utive branch abuse of power that currently exists—confidentiality from the executive branch—by eliminating the possibility that the constitutionally required JSC
confidentiality could be sustained.267
An ethics commission would encroach upon judicial powers in a third way. The
commission’s power to draft a code of ethics for judges and judicial employees,
and its power to release advisory opinions, would encroach on the judicial powers
of the supreme court to administrate and impose superintending control over the
lower courts and judicial employees. Advisory opinions and codes of conduct, by
definition, are an attempt to control the behavior of the actors for whom they are
provided. The judicial branch already has a code of conduct, and it already has a
system for providing advisory opinions for its judges. The code of conduct was
mentioned previously, the judicial branch personnel rules.268 The personnel rules
are adopted, amended, and repealed at the discretion of the supreme court.269 Further, a committee within the judicial education center, the advisory committee on
the code of judicial conduct (a New Mexico Supreme Court–appointed advisory
committee), has released over one hundred advisory opinions on judicial conduct
since 1986.270 That committee responds to inquiries from judges seeking guidance
on personal business dealings, political activities, acceptance of gifts, charitable
work, teaching and writing, and many other issues.271 The introduction of a new
code of conduct for judicial employees, and another committee providing advice
on ethical conduct of judges, would be confusing. Further, they would force the
judicial branch codes and advisory opinions to compete for legitimacy with ethics
commission codes and advisory opinions.
Because the ethics commission would foreclose judiciary actions that are indisputably judicial, through its numerous encroachments upon judicial powers, the
disruptions are unconstitutional.272
4. Legislative Infringement
Again assuming the ethics commission would belong to the executive branch,273
it must not unconstitutionally infringe upon the legislative branch. The analysis to
determine legislative branch infringement entails the same steps taken to determine whether the commission would cause judicial infringement in the preceding
sections.274 Because the identity of the acting branch has been identified (as executive), the next step is characterizing the commission’s acts as to the type of power
they embody.275 Finally, whether those acts disrupt the proper balance between the
executive and legislative branches must be determined.276

267. Id.
268. SUPREME COURT OF N.M., JUDICIAL BRANCH PERSONNEL RULES 47–49 (2005).
269. Id. at 4.
270. Judicial Education Center, Judicial Conduct Advisory Opinions, Institute of Public Law, http://
jec.unm.edu/resources/advisoryopinions/index.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2009).
271. Id.
272. See supra Part IV.E.1.
273. See supra Part IV.E.2.
274. See supra Part IV.E.3.
275. See supra Part IV.E.1.
276. See supra Part IV.E.1.
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a. Legislative Powers
House Bill 151 provides for a commission that would embody some legislative
powers. The New Mexico Supreme Court has recognized the legislature’s proper
role as “creating law,” distinguishable from the executive role, “execution of
laws.”277 The legislature is constitutionally granted the power to “select its own
officers and employees.”278 Further, the legislature is “the judge of election and
qualification of its members.”279 The legislature may determine its rules of procedure and it may punish its members or others for contempt or disorderly behavior
in its presence.280 The New Mexico House of Representatives has sole impeachment power, and the New Mexico Senate tries all impeachments.281 These constitutional provisions, taken together, make administering legislative employees, and
legislator oversight, “legislative powers.” The constitutional provision providing
for employee selection power is analogous to the New Mexico Supreme Court’s
constitutionally granted power to hire and fire employees.282 Similarly, although
there is not a New Mexico “Legislative Standards Commission” explicitly created
in the constitution, the constitutional provisions granting the legislature the power
to determine the qualification of its members, the power to punish them, and the
power to take them to trial, all implicitly designate the legislature as holding the
power to judge and evaluate its own members as to their continued membership.
There are several ethics commission powers that embody legislative powers.
House Bill 151 provides for a commission with the authority to promulgate rules
and draft ethics codes that would embody the legislative power to make law. The
commission’s procedural and due process rules would be applied in the same manner as court rules or administrative agency rules. The commission-drafted codes of
ethics would be applied in the same manner as violations of other statutes deemed
“ethics violations.”283 Similarly, House Bill 151 provisions embody legislative powers by giving the commission authority to receive and investigate complaints about
legislators, giving the commission authority to receive, investigate, and make public reports and reprimands about legislative employees, and by mandating legislative committee action on commission referrals.
b. Legislative Encroachment
If House Bill 151 provisions would give the commission legislative powers, and
would prevent the legislative branch from accomplishing its assigned functions,
those provisions would unconstitutionally infringe upon the legislative branch.284
The following analysis will first consider the commission’s lawmaking powers and
analyze them for potential legislative infringement. Next, it will analyze the com-

277.
P.2d 691,
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Clark, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22 (citing State v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Court, 36 N.M. 151, 153, 9
692 (1932)).
N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
Id. § 7.
Id. § 11.
Id. § 35.
See supra Part IV.E.3.
See supra Part III.B.
See State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 573, 904 P.2d 11, 22 (1995).
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mission’s powers to administer legislative employees and to provide oversight for
legislators.
The lawmaking functions delegated to the commission would be less invasive
than executive actions found unconstitutional previously. In Clark, the New Mexico Supreme Court found the governor’s act of entering into compacts with governors of New Mexico pueblos for revenue sharing unconstitutionally infringed upon
the legislature’s lawmaking powers.285 The governor’s “law making” acts gave a
tribe a “virtually irrevocable right” that the legislature could not take away
through future legislation.286 Further, compacts struck “detailed and specific agreement” against the legislature’s implied will, regarding activities that the legislature
was authorized to prohibit or regulate.287
The lawmaking functions delegated to the proposed commission would not prevent the legislature from accomplishing its constitutionally-assigned lawmaking
functions. First, unlike the gaming compacts the governor entered in Clark, which
could not be altered by the legislature, the legislature could override any code
adopted by the ethics commission by passing a statute for that purpose. Also unlike Clark, in which the governor had acted contrary to legislative posture, the
legislature’s adoption of ethics commission legislation, such as House Bill 151,
would suggest legislative delegation of lawmaking power. The Clark opinion did
caution, however, that a delegation of authority by the legislature must be express
and provide clear standards.288
Whether a delegation of lawmaking power includes clear and express standards
is the focus of separation of powers analysis when New Mexico courts determine if
an administrative agency is acting within constitutionally acceptable limits.289 When
the clear and express standards analysis was applied in Montoya v. O’Toole to determine whether the New Mexico Board of Pharmacy had a constitutional delegation of authority to schedule drugs, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that the
board’s authority was clear and express. The legislature had established “strict
guidelines for the Board . . . to follow in determining the substance’s potential for
abuse.”290 The legislative mandate required placing substances in categories based
on specific criteria; for example, a substance should be placed in Schedule I if the

285. See id.
286. Id. at 574, 904 P.2d at 23.
287. Id. at 573–75, 904 P.2d at 22–24. The governor’s actions were like those taken by U.S. President
Harry Truman in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., in which U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson wrote
that the executive powers were at their lowest ebb when contrary to the expressed or implied will of Congress.
Id. at 575, 904 P.2d at 24 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–55 (1952)).
288. Id. at 576–77, 904 P.2d at 25–26.
289. See State ex rel. Sofeico v. Heffernan, 41 N.M. 219, 67 P.2d 240, 245 (1937). The general rule is that:
[A] statute or ordinance which vests arbitrary discretion with respect to an ordinarily lawful
business [or] profession . . . in public officials, without prescribing a uniform rule of action . . . and without being controlled or guided by any definite rule or specified conditions to which all similarly situated might knowingly conform, is unconstitutional and void.
Id. Nevertheless, some situations require discretion “‘where it is difficult or impracticable to lay down a definite, comprehensive rule, or the discretion relates to the administration of a police regulation and it is necessary to protect the public morals, health, safety, and general welfare.’” Id. (citations omitted).
290. Montoya v. O’Toole, 94 N.M. 303, 304, 610 P.2d 190, 191 (1980). The guidelines required consideration of: “actual or relative abuse of the substance; . . . scientific evidence of the pharmacological effect; . . . state of current scientific knowledge regarding the substance; . . . history and current pattern of
abuse; . . . [and] scope, duration and significance of abuse. . .” Id. (omitting three more guidelines).
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substance: “(1) has a high potential for abuse; and (2) has no accepted medical use
in treatment in the United States or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment
under medical supervision.”291
House Bill 151 does not provide express and clear standards for commission
procedural rules or ethics codes, and thus the lawmaking delegation would likely
be unconstitutional. In fact, House Bill 151 provides no standards for rules of procedure, rules of investigation, or hearings.292 It simply calls for the commission to
make its own rules in these areas.293 In addition, House Bill 151 provides no standards for drafting the proposed act’s mandated ethics codes.294 The commission
could define anything as an ethical violation in its proposed codes.295 While agencies’ elected leaders would have to adopt the ethics codes after the commission
drafted them, this requirement would simply incorporate additional executive actors in the legislative action of lawmaking.296 Thus, House Bill 151 would violate
the constitutionally protected separation of powers by delegating legislative lawmaking powers without incorporating clear and express standards.
The proposed ethics commission’s legislative powers to administer legislative
employees and provide legislator oversight would be more substantial than the
commission’s proposed judicial powers to administer judicial employees and provide judicial oversight.297 Because the commission’s legislative powers would be
greater than the commission’s judicial powers that would infringe upon the judicial
branch,298 and because the legislature is constitutionally authorized to administer
legislative employees and to regulate its own membership similarly to the judicial
branch,299 the ethics commission’s legislative powers to regulate legislative actors
would unconstitutionally infringe upon the legislative branch.
F. Redundant Oversight
Setting separation of powers considerations aside, an ethics commission—particularly as proposed in House Bill 151—would otherwise overlap powers and duties with existing agencies. It is possible that the redundant responsibilities would
enhance the respective agencies’ efficacies. The redundancy, however, might also
hinder such agencies if confusion or inefficiency resulted.
The redundancy is first apparent in the House Bill 151 “ethics violation” definition, which defines such violations as including violations of several existing statutes. There are already enforcement mechanisms for violations of these statutes.
Commission involvement would create an additional layer of oversight. For example, the secretary of state currently administers parts of the government conduct
act, from the agency’s receipt of complaints arising under the act, to the agency’s
enforcement of the act’s provisions. The commission would also receive complaints
about violations of the government conduct act, and would investigate, hold hear291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.G.
See supra Part IV.E.3.b.
See supra part IV.E.4.a.
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ings, and recommend enforcement for complaints about non-criminal violations.
House Bill 151 does not delineate the relationship that is envisioned between the
entities that currently have oversight over existing statutes and the newly proposed
commission.
One possible outcome of commission redundancy with other agencies’ responsibilities is that the existence of the commission might have no effect other than to
waste funds, and to create the appearance of greater government oversight.300 Creating a new governmental body, however, should have greater consequence than
improving the image of government accountability. Public complacency under a
perception of strong safeguards may be more dangerous than no safeguards. At
least without such a perception, the public may accept responsibility for evaluating
public actors, and thus may be more aware of government conduct. With perceived
safeguards in place, however, the public may see less need for citizen vigilance,
even if that perception has no basis in reality.
A second possible, and contrasting, outcome of commission redundancy with
other state agencies is that the commission might become the de-facto one-stop
shop for all government-related complaints, as a result of having such broad personal jurisdiction. The commission, however, would have to refer many of these
complaints to other oversight agencies: the JSC, the secretary of state, the attorney
general, the legislative ethics committee, the senate rules committee, and the district attorneys. These referrals would result due to the nature of the complaints.
Complaints describing criminal violations, complaints relating to judges, and complaints about any activities not included in the definition of an ethics violation
under House Bill 151, would have to be referred to other agencies or would have
to be dismissed. The referrals could also result because, even if the commission had
concurrent jurisdiction with other agencies, the commission would not have time
for anything other than categorizing and directing complaints. This outcome, although not inherently negative, would defeat the implementation of one of the key
desired characteristics of an ethics commission—its ability to independently investigate complaints.301 Such a demotion to “referral service,” simply redirecting complaints to the agencies that would have received the complaints prior to the
creation of the commission, would preclude any possible improvement to the existing oversight system through the commission’s supposed independence from
other oversight agencies.
Promulgating ethics codes for each government agency would be another redundant commission duty.302 House Bill 151 calls for the ethics commission to draft
an ethics code for each state agency.303 Under the existing government conduct act,
however, each executive agency is already required to file codes of conduct with
the secretary of state.304 If an agency does not file a code of conduct, the agency is

300. This is the idea that more oversight agencies should be equated with more public protection from
corruption.
301. Moore & Kerns, State Ethics Commissions, supra note 217.
302. See supra Part III.C.
303. See supra Part III.C. There are over 300 state agencies. See NMSA 1978, Executive Agency Index
(2009).
304. See supra note 108; see also Appendix 3 (listing New Mexico agencies with a code of conduct filed
with the secretary of state).

R
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subject to the code of conduct filed by the office of the governor.305 Many of the
codes on file with the secretary of state were filed years ago, but they are still
enforceable.306 In addition to the required executive codes of conduct, both the
legislature and judiciary have published conduct guides for their employees and
elected officials.307 No commission proposal provision calls for the use of the existing codes of conduct, and the use of the new ethics codes would depend upon
adoption by each governmental agency after the commission drafted them.308
House Bill 151 does not provide guidance as to the effect the new ethics codes
would have on the already-filed codes of conduct. It also does not provide for the
likely scenario that some agencies would readily adopt ethics codes promulgated
by the commission, while others might never do so. Thus, some agencies would
have a valid code of conduct filed with the secretary of state, and others would
have a valid code of ethics with oversight provided by the commission.
Legislator oversight would be yet another redundant component of the proposed commission. The legislature has its own code of ethics309 and internal oversight mechanisms, including the house rules committee, senate ethics committee,
and interim legislative ethics committee.310 These committees meet to provide published advisory opinions,311 to investigate allegations,312 and to recommend action
based on their findings.313 These committees are not independent, however, from
the legislature itself.314 House Bill 151 does not suggest a solution to reconcile conflicting advisory opinions issued by the commission and legislative oversight committees, nor does it describe the relationship that would exist between the
commission and the three legislative ethics committees.
Redundant statutory oversight, uncoordinated sets of conduct codes, and redundant legislator oversight are ingredients in a recipe for confusion and inefficiency.
Without explicit delineation between the powers and duties of the proposed ethics
commission and the responsibilities held by existing agencies, confusion will reign.

305. See Appendix 4 (discussing agencies without a code of conduct filled with the secretary of state).
306. Several codes on file with the secretary of state as of 2009 were for agencies that no longer exist, or
for agencies that exist under a new name since the time the codes were filed. See Appendix 3.
307. See supra Part IV.C.
308. See supra Part III.C.
309. See LEGIS. COUNCIL SERV., NEW MEXICO LEGISLATIVE ETHICS GUIDE (2007).
310. See N.M. HOUSE RULES 9-1 (2007) to -2 (1993); N.M. SEN. RULES 9-13-1 to -7 (1992); see also N.M.
HOUSE RULES 26-1 (1991) to -2 (2004); N.M. SEN. RULES 26-1 (1992) to -2 (2004) (discussing ethics and ethics
training for legislators).
311. In the last fifteen years the house rules committee published two opinions. The senate ethics committee published one. The interim legislative rules committee published three advisory opinions and one letter
(in response to a request for an advisory opinion in a matter in which the committee stated it did not have
jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion). See generally Advisory Opinions: LEC97-2; LEC97-1; LEC96-1; S941; H94-2; H94-1; see also Letter from Interim Legislative Ethics Committee to Linda M. Lopez, Senator (Jan.
22, 1998) (on file with author). No advisory opinions from any of these committees have been published in
over ten years.
312. There is no record of committee investigations or discussions because allegations are confidential
unless and until the committee finds reason to make them public and bring them to the full house or senate.
See N.M. HOUSE RULES 9-13-4 (1993); N.M. SEN. RULES 9-13-6 (1992).
313. See N.M. HOUSE RULES 9-13-6 (1993); N.M. SEN. RULES 9-13-4 (1992).
314. All legislative ethics committee members are legislators themselves, and the committees are staffed
with legislative staff members. See generally N.M. HOUSE RULES; N.M. SEN. RULES.
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G. Complainant Protections
Under House Bill 151, retaliation against complainants, witnesses, and others
providing assistance to the commission, would be prohibited during the investigation of alleged ethics violations.315 The bill does not, however, provide any penalty
for violation of those prohibitions. The bill also does not classify the violation of
that prohibition as a misdemeanor or criminal offense. In effect, the omission of a
penalty for the prohibited retaliation would swallow any effect the prohibition
could have had.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
If the proposed commission is more than a symbolic proposition, directed towards the ambiguous goal of improved state government ethics, lawmakers should
address the issues raised in the previous Part. This Part makes some recommendations to avoid the identified issues.
A. Improved Methodology for Reform Recommendations
New Mexico political leaders should revise their methodology used to design
ethics reform. Rather than studying the various laws and administrative schemes
available for “reform,” and then making recommendations designed to catch up
with other states’ “advancements,” recommendations should address known
problems through solutions tailored to solve those problems. If the governor and
legislators are serious about improving government ethics, they must first articulate the specific problems they wish to remedy. The proposed ethics commission
would not provide relief for New Mexico’s known problems of brazen criminal
corruption. If an ethics commission would serve some purpose, then, it must be
assumed that there are governmental ethical problems beyond the known criminal
scandals.316 In order to address such problems, however, they must first be named.
The idea to first articulate a state’s needs before proposing remedies is not original. Other states have assessed their needs. New Jersey, for example, conducted an
ethics audit before proposing legislative recommendations.317 The audit involved a
survey of all government employees as to their knowledge of the state’s conflict of
interest laws.318 The state then designed a program to educate their employees
based on the survey results.
New Mexico leaders could similarly use a self-assessment to define the state’s
problems (that is, those beyond the known criminal scandals covering the front
pages of the state’s newspapers on a frequent basis). New Mexico would not have
to limit its self-assessment to surveys of employee knowledge of ethics laws.
Rather, the evaluation could be much more comprehensive. The assessment could
gauge and evaluate agency adherence to established codes of conduct. Similarly,
random audits of candidate’s financial reports could be assessed as to their accuracy and completeness. Continuing this line of logic, employees’ and government

315. See supra Part III.
316. See generally supra Part II.
317. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ETHICS COUNSEL TO THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
2–3 (2005).
318. Id.
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officials’ knowledge of, and adherence to, each existing statute, violations of which
were included in the House Bill 151 definition of “ethics violation,” could be evaluated. After such an evaluation, leaders could assess whether non-criminal ethics
problems exist, and assess the relative magnitude of these problems.
In order to determine whether the proposed commission’s various powers and
duties would address existing problems, the New Mexico self-assessment could
specifically question whether the existence of such a commission would change
employee, candidate, and politician behavior. For example, government employees
could anonymously disclose whether they know about ethical violations they have
not reported under the state’s existing oversight structure. The assessment could
determine why those individuals have not reported violations, and how the violation occurred without others’ knowledge. Do employees know where to report
violations? What kind of violations are occurring that are not being reported? Do
employees or government officials fear retaliation? Do they lack confidence in the
institutions currently vested with the power to receive a particular type of complaint? Is the unethical conduct part of a culture of accepted conduct? Would an
employee willingly submit and sign a complaint to report unethical conduct if retaliation for such a report was known to be prohibited? Depending upon the answers to these questions lawmakers might have a good reason to implement a
remedy.
Once the state’s needs are established through self-assessment, proposals for
reform should be specifically crafted to address those needs. This may be accomplished through designing original reforms, or by looking at other states’ best practices to solve those specific problems. If what is needed is improved public
perception, or a feeling of equivalence as compared to other states, however, creating an ethics commission as proposed in House Bill 151 may be the perfect
remedy.
B. Appropriate Funding
If a need for an ethics commission were established, the commission should be
adequately funded so that it may accomplish its legally mandated duties. Further,
if the commission were to exert any of its powers described in House Bill 151 to
investigate, hold hearings, and make findings, both the commission and risk management division of the general services department should be funded commensurately with the commission’s workload.
The appropriate level of direct funding for the commission can be estimated by
looking to analogous agencies. The most similar New Mexico agency,319 the JSC,
has an annual operational budget of approximately $851,000.320 The JSC’s jurisdiction, however, is limited to oversight of district, magistrate, and appellate judges,321

319. See supra Part IV.E.2.
320. The JSC budget for fiscal year 2009 was $851,000. The JSC employs an executive director, and
seven other staff. In addition, it contracts for investigation support. The JSC received 2,500 inquires regarding
judicial disciplinary matters and docketed 144 complaints during fiscal year 2008. See LEGIS. FINANCE COMM.,
REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE FINANCE COMMITTEE TO THE FORTY NINTH LEGISLATURE 4 (N.M. 2009).
321. See N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32.
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less than a few hundred individuals.322 The commission, on the other hand, would
have jurisdiction over all state employees, including regular, appointed, and
elected individuals.323 In addition, commission jurisdiction would extend to state
officials not included on the state payroll; for example, the appointed board members on professional boards such as the board of pharmacy, and the regents on all
state university boards of regents, would be under the commission’s jurisdiction.324
The commission would have jurisdiction over lobbyists325 and government contractors.326 This breadth of jurisdiction would be massive, particularly for one executive
director and a general counsel, and could translate into a massive workload. Even
if the commission did not receive substantial numbers of complaints, or requests
for advisory opinions, it would still have to draft ethics codes for all state agencies,
provide legislative recommendations, and submit an annual report.327
The commission’s operating budget should finance the commission’s staff salaries and benefits as state employees, as well as any contractual services and supplies the commission would likely require. The commission would need at least the
amount originally recommended in the 2006 Task Force proposal, $1,000,000.328
Because the first year of commission operation would be limited,329 the first year’s
operational budget might appropriately be set lower.
Because it is difficult, at least initially, to estimate commission and risk management division workload, the legislature should create a revolving fund to finance
investigations, hearings, and legal representation. The fund would only be used for
those purposes. The fund would allow both agencies to track the costs of investigations and representation—the work-load-dependent aspects of the two agencies’
assigned duties under House Bill 151. Further, such a fund would allow the risk
management division relief from seeking the funding to cover new legal expenditures not included in its current budget.
C. Separation of Powers
To avoid the likely successful challenges to the commission’s constitutionality
under the separation of powers provision in the New Mexico Constitution, there
are at least two options. First, many constitutional violations would be protected

322. There are ten court of appeals judges, NMSA 1978, § 34-5-1 (1990); eighty-eight district court
judges, NMSA 1978, § 34-6-4 to -16 (2009); eighteen metropolitan court judges, N.M. LEGIS. FINANCE COMM.,
REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE FINANCE COMMITTEE TO THE FORTY NINTH LEGISLATURE 39 (2009); sixty-five
magistrate judges, see generally id., and an unknown number of municipal judges.
323. Id. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
324. See supra Part III.B.
325. There were 768 registered lobbyists during the 2009 legislative session. Secretary of State, Index of
Active Lobbyists, http://ethics.sos.state.nm.us/LOBBY/LOB.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2009).
326. The number of government contractors in New Mexico is unknown. This author contacted various
department of finance and administration contract administrators who reported that the information would
only be possible to ascertain upon the implementation of a new database of government contractors. Such a
database was required by a bill that was passed by the legislature in 2009. See LEGIS. COUNCIL SERV., 2009
CONCORDANCE REPORT, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009); see also H.B. 546, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009);
see also Email from Nicole Gillespie, senior policy analyst, New Mexico Department of Finance and Administration, to Erin McSherry, Class of 2010, University of New Mexico School of Law (Apr. 20, 2009, 14:45 MDT)
(on file with author).
327. See supra Part III.C.
328. This assumes a workload greater than that experienced by the JSC.
329. See supra Part III.E.
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against through a constitutional amendment. Second, because it is difficult to
amend the constitution, it is also useful to explore how to statutorily create a commission in such a way that it would not violate constitutionally protected separation of powers.
A constitutional amendment would address violations of separation of power
protections by creating the commission within the executive branch, or by creating
the commission as a “fourth branch” or intermediate, quasi-branch. If the commission were created in the executive branch, then its duties would by definition embody executive powers, rather than legislative and judicial powers, and might
therefore avoid infringement upon the other two branches.330 The constitutionality
of the commission would also likely persevere if the commission were created
through a constitutional amendment as a quasi-branch, or as a fourth branch of
government. In that case, however, the established separation of powers analysis
might require an entire revision.331
The New Mexico Constitution could also be amended to create a separate ethics
commission assigned to each branch, or it could be amended to allow for the creation of such branch-specific commissions statutorily. There are other states with
multiple commissions, each with responsibility over only one branch or group of
government-related actors.332 Because the JSC already exists within the judicial
branch, its jurisdiction could be expanded to include judicial employees in order to
accomplish the full scope of judicial-branch duties contemplated in House Bill 151.
Similar commissions could be established in both the legislative and executive
branches. Because implementing stronger oversight for government contractors
and lobbyists would not risk violating separation of powers protections, that goal
could be approached constitutionally or statutorily.
If a commission were enacted by statute, the legislature should implement the
desired oversight without incorporating shared jurisdiction over any combination
of executive, legislative, and judicial actors. An executive branch commission,
without legislative or judicial oversight, would be constitutional under the separation of powers doctrine and could have jurisdiction over approximately 20,000 executive branch employees, many elected and appointed officials, government
contractors, lobbyists, and all candidates for office. Because the judicial branch’s
constitutional provisions provide for self-regulation, statutes creating non-judicial
commissions with judicial oversight would not be constitutional without passing
constitutional amendments. Because the legislature similarly has the constitutional
power to self-regulate, statutes creating non-legislative commissions with legislative oversight may be unconstitutional as delegations of power, unless the delegation is expressed with clear standards; however, the legislature could also pass
legislation that would further clarify its own oversight power.

330. See supra Part IV.E.
331. It seems that such a creation would cause disruption to many existing governmental checks and
balances and such a proposal is beyond the scope of this note.
332. For example, Washington has a state legislative ethics board, a state executive ethics board, and a
public disclosure commission. The public disclosure commission receives financial disclosures from both legislative and executive officials, but the other two boards are branch-specific. See National Conference of State
Legislatures, State Ethics Commissions: Jurisdiction, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/ethics/ec_jurisdiction.htm
(last visited Dec. 29, 2009).
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D. Redundancy
There are at least two ways to resolve the issues likely to arise due to commission redundancy with existing state agencies’ powers and duties.333 The commission
enabling legislation should either recognize and streamline any ethics commission
responsibility overlaps with other state agencies’ responsibilities, or it should eliminate the redundancies. Either of these changes would provide more clarity of process for all parties involved, thus avoiding confusion, waste of time, and sullied
investigations.
Commission enabling legislation should provide specific guidelines both recognizing and streamlining any duties and powers that would overlap other state agencies’ duties and powers. Whether and how such overlapping powers should be
shared between agencies depends upon the outcome of the ethics audit recommended in this note.334 If there are certain illegal acts that are not currently reported, or effectively enforced, and the assessment indicates such situation would
be best remedied through an ethics commission, then delegating such responsibility to an ethics commission may be appropriate. In such circumstances, ethics commission enabling legislation should specify that the commission is the preferred
oversight agency for such violations. The enabling legislation should also provide a
process to follow if two agencies investigate a complaint simultaneously, or directions as to how that situation would be avoided. If the existing oversight for a
particular ethics violation is partially functional, but requires commission assistance due to the existing oversight’s inherent limitation, the commission’s designated responsibility should reflect that need. If an existing oversight mechanism is
functioning, then commission enabling legislation should either recognize that success and specify that complaints for that type of violation should be referred to the
existing oversight agency, or the legislation should not assign responsibility for that
oversight to an ethics commission at all.
If redundancies between the commission and existing agencies are to be eliminated or reduced, some of the powers House Bill 151 assigned to the commission,
such as the ethics training function, should be defined as duties, and some of the
assigned duties should be eliminated. These suggestions would ensure the commission has assigned responsibilities beyond those already assigned to other agencies,
and would reduce the risk that the commission would simply create a veneer of
improved governmental ethics. At the same time, existing agencies’ responsibilities
would not be partially usurped. If those agencies are not satisfactorily engaged in
their responsibilities, the executive and legislature should investigate ways to improve their performance. The legislature should not create new agencies to compensate for the others’ ineffectiveness without ensuring the existing agencies have
the tools for success.335
To eliminate or streamline the code of conduct redundancy, codes of conduct
filed under the requirements of the government conduct act should be eliminated,
333. See supra Part IV.F.
334. See supra Part V.A.
335. The 1992 Task Force recognized this when it decided not to implement an ethics commission. See
supra note 182 and accompanying text. Without an ethics audit, it is difficult to know whether existing agencies
are effective at responding to ethics violations and whether any deficiencies would be resolved through implementation of an ethics commission. See supra Part V.A.

R

\\server05\productn\N\NMX\39-3\NMX306.txt

Summer 2009]

unknown

Seq: 39

THE PROPOSED STATE ETHICS COMMISSION ACT

18-JUN-10

11:45

635

should stand and be improved without the interference of new ethics codes, or
they should be incorporated into the ethics codes the commission would be required to draft. Eliminating the commission’s ethics code drafting responsibility is
another option to eliminate this redundancy. Although the codes filed with the
secretary of state may not be current, they could be updated rather than completely replaced by, or confused with, new commission ethics codes. If eliminating
or improving the existing government conduct act codes of conduct is not undertaken, commission-enabling legislation should include violations of those codes
within its definition of an “ethics violation,” providing for a more streamlined set
of rules and reduced confusion.
E. Complainant Protections
A state ethics commission act should encourage good faith reporting of ethics
violations by minimizing fear of backlash from supervisors and coworkers. While
House Bill 151 prohibited retaliation and other adverse actions against complainants, witnesses, and others providing assistance during the investigation of alleged
ethics violations, in order to be effective the legislation should also specify a penalty and an enforcement authority to respond to violations of those prohibitions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ethics commission proposed in House Bill 151 would not address the criminal political corruption that has driven the search for ethics reform in New Mexico
during the last four years. While the creation of a new agency with broad jurisdiction and “independence” from the existing branches may seem attractive when
corruption appears rampant in all government branches, if the effort to create such
an agency is actually more of a distraction from, rather than a solution to, the
state’s real problems, it is a mirage. The risk of grasping at such a perceived
waterhole in the desert was recognized in 1993, when the idea of creating an ethics
commission was concluded to “skew the proper focus of attention.”336 What was
important then was that laws made sense, that they were workable, sound, and
were enforced. In reality there is no reason an ethics commission would not have
the same challenges as any other—existing—oversight agency, and because criminal scandals have primarily caused the public to question the legitimacy of the
government, alternative reforms should be prioritized to expose and destroy the
roots of these glaring unacceptable acts. An ethics commission would not address
New Mexico’s criminal scandals and should only be created if an assessment of the
state government demonstrates a need for such a commission. Further, enabling
legislation should only be considered when it designs a commission to address a
documented need, clearly delineates commission responsibilities shared with other
agencies, protects constitutional separation of powers, commits adequate funds,
and protects complainants.

336. See GOVERNMENT ETHICS TASK FORCE, supra note 182, at 9.

R

\\server05\productn\N\NMX\39-3\NMX306.txt

636

unknown

Seq: 40

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

18-JUN-10

11:45

[Vol. 39

APPENDIX 1
Governor Richardson’s Task Force on Ethics and Election Reform Members337
(2006 Task Force)
Co-Chairs:
Garrey Carruthers, former governor, New Mexico State University Vice President
for Economic Development
Suellen Scarnecchia, University of New Mexico School of Law Dean
Members:
Stuart Bluestone, New Mexico Deputy Attorney General
Barbara Brazil, New Mexico First
Matt Brix, Common Cause
Doug Brown, New Mexico State Treasurer
Maralyn Budke, public member
John Carey, New Mexico Association of Commerce and Industry
Dede Feldman, New Mexico State Senator
Mary Grana, public member
Gay Kernan, New Mexico State Senator
W. Ken Martinez, New Mexico State Representative
Kathy McCoy, New Mexico State Representative
Andrew Montgomery, public member
Jim Noel, Judicial Standards Commission
Leonard R. Sanchez, Moss-Adams, L.L.P.
Ron Soloman, Indian Pueblo Cultural Center
Hilary Tompkins, Office of the Governor
Steward Udall, former U.S. Secretary of the Interior
Brad Winter, Albuquerque City Councilor
APPENDIX 2
2007 Members of The Governor’s Task Force on Ethics and Election Reform338
(2007 Task Force)
Co-Chairs:
Garrey Carruthers, former governor, New Mexico State University Vice President
for Economic Development
Suellen Scarnecchia, University of New Mexico School of Law Dean
Members:
Diane Denish, New Mexico Lieutenant Governor

337. See 2006 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 4, at 3. Members of the 2006 Task Force are
listed with the affiliations they held at the time they were appointed.
338. See 2007 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 62. Members are listed with the affiliations
they held when they were appointed to the 2007 Task Force.

R
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Stewart Udall, former Secretary of the Interior
Governor Charlie Dorame, Tesuque Pueblo
James Lewis, New Mexico State Treasurer
Stuart Bluestone, Deputy Attorney General
Dede Feldman, New Mexico State Senator
John Ryan, New Mexico State Senator
Ken Martinez, New Mexico House of Representatives Majority Leader
Jeff Steinborn, New Mexico State Representative
Don Tripp, New Mexico State Representative
Bill McCamley, Doña Ana County Commissioner
Jim Noel, Judicial Standards Commission
Doug Brown, Brown and Brown Ventures
Leonard Sanchez, CPA, Moss Adams LLP
Norman Thayer, Sutin, Thayer, & Browne
Tom Keesing, Santa Fe Agency Real Estate
Geno Zamora, Zamora Strategic Advisors
Fred Nathan, Think New Mexico
Matt Brix, Center for Civic Policy
Claire Weiner, public member
Maralyn Budke, public member
APPENDIX 3
New Mexico Agencies with Codes of Conduct Filed with the New Mexico
Secretary of State339
Advisory
Attorney
Board of
Board of
Board of
Board of

Board of Respiratory Care Practitioners340
General341
Examiners for Architects342
Landscape Architects343
Optometry344
Podiatry345

339. The listed agencies had codes of conduct on file with the New Mexico Secretary of State as of
February 6, 2009. See email from Tracey Littrell, Ethics Administration, Secretary of State Office to Erin
McSherry, Class of 2010, University of New Mexico School of Law (Feb. 6, 2009 15:02 MST) (on file with
author). Agencies are listed alphabetically as indexed in the New Mexico Statutes Annotated, by their
statutory name (if not listed in the index), or as named in the New Mexico Constitution. See NMSA 1978,
Executive Agency Index (2009) (listing statutorily-created executive, legislative, and judicial agencies); § 3414-1 (2001) (creating the civil legal services commission); § 61-12C-7 (1999) (creating the massage therapy
board); § 61-28B-4 (2003) (creating the New Mexico public accountancy board); § 67-3-6 (2003) (creating a
department of transportation); see also N.M. CONST., art. V, § 1 (establishing the governor, lieutenant
governor, secretary of state, state auditor, state treasurer, attorney general, and commissioner of public lands);
N.M. CONST., art. XII, § 11 (establishing the New Mexico School for the Deaf).
340. See ADVISORY BD. FOR RESPIRATORY CARE PRACTITIONERS, BOARD MEMBER CODE OF CONDUCT (1998).
341. See ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF N.M, CODE OF CONDUCT (2007).
342. See BD. OF EXAM’RS FOR ARCHITECTS, STATE OF N.M., CODE OF CONDUCT STATEMENT (1996).
343. See BD. OF LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTS, STATE OF N. M., CODE OF CONDUCT (2005).
344. See BD. OF EXAM’RS IN OPTOMETRY, STATE OF N.M., 2005 BOARD MEMBER CODE OF CONDUCT
(2005).
345. See BD. OF PODIATRY, STATE OF N.M., CODE OF CONDUCT (1995).
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Border Authority346
Children, Youth and Families Department347
Civil Legal Services Commission348
Department of Transportation349
Energy Minerals and Natural Resources Department350
Environmental Improvement Board351
General Services Department352
Governor353
Human Services Department354
Labor Department355
Legislative Council Service356
Lieutenant Governor357
Massage Therapy Board358
New Mexico Public Utility Commission359
New Mexico School for the Deaf360
Nutrition and Dietetics Practice Board361
Personnel Board362
Public Accountancy Board363
Secretary of State364
State Auditor365
State Board of Nursing Home Administrators366
State Board of Psychologist Examiners367
State Board of Thanatopractice of the State of New Mexico368

346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

See N.M. BORDER AUTHORITY BD. OF DIRS., 2004 BOARD MEMBER CODE OF CONDUCT (2004).
See CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES DEP’T, CODE OF CONDUCT 2.1 (1999).
See N.M. CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. COMM’N, CODE OF CONDUCT (2001).
See N.M. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CODE OF CONDUCT AD 628 (2006).
See ENERGY, MINERALS & NATURAL RES. DEP’T, STATE OF N.M., SEPARATE AGENCY CODE OF
CONDUCT (2007).
351. See ENVTL. IMPROVEMENT BD., STATE OF N.M., CODE OF CONDUCT (1997).
352. See GEN. SERVS. DEP’T, STATE OF N.M., CODE OF CONDUCT 350-2.00 (1998).
353. See GOVERNOR, STATE OF N.M., CODE OF CONDUCT (2007).
354. See GEN. SERVS. DEP’T, EMPLOYEE CODE OF CONDUCT 041 (1994).
355. See EMPLOYMENT SEC. DIV. BD. OF REVIEW, DEP’T OF LABOR, CODE OF CONDUCT (1995). In
2007, the labor department became the workforce solutions department. See NMSA 1978, § 9-26-15 (2007).
356. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SERV., NEW MEXICO LEGISLATIVE STAFF CODE OF CONDUCT (2008).
357. See LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR, STATE OF N. M., CODE OF CONDUCT (2003).
358. See MASSAGE THERAPY BD., CODE OF CONDUCT-RESOLUTION 2 (2008).
359. See N.M. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, CODE OF CONDUCT (1995). As of 1999, the New Mexico Public
Utility Commission is part of the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission. See NMSA 1978, § 8-8-21
(1998).
360. See N.M. SCH. FOR THE DEAF, CODE OF CONDUCT 135 (1996).
361. See NUTRITION & DIETETICS PRAC. BD., STATE OF N.M., CODE OF CONDUCT (2005).
362. See PERSONNEL BD., STATE OF N.M., CODE OF CONDUCT (2008).
363. See PUB. ACCOUNTANCY BD., STATE OF N.M., CODE OF CONDUCT (2003).
364. See SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE OF N.M., CODE OF CONDUCT (1999).
365. See STATE AUDITOR, STATE OF N.M., CODE OF CONDUCT (1998).
366. See NURSING HOME ADMIN’RS BD., STATE OF N. M., 2006 BOARD MEMBER CODE OF CONDUCT
(2006).
367. See N.M. STATE BD. OF PSYCHOLOGIST EXAM’RS, 2007/2008 BOARD MEMBER CODE OF CONDUCT
(2007).
368. See N.M. BD. OF THANATOPRACTICE, CODE OF CONDUCT-RESOLUTION 2 (2004).

\\server05\productn\N\NMX\39-3\NMX306.txt

Summer 2009]

unknown

Seq: 43

18-JUN-10

THE PROPOSED STATE ETHICS COMMISSION ACT

11:45

639

State Corporation Commission369
State Land Office370
State Treasurer371
Transportation Authority372
APPENDIX 4
Agencies Without a Code of Conduct Filed with the New Mexico
Secretary of State373
Over 200 New Mexico state agencies have not filed a code of conduct with the
secretary of state. There are over 300 statutorily created agencies listed in the New
Mexico state agency index, which is not exhaustive, while there are approximately
thirty state agencies with codes of conduct on file with the secretary of state.374
Further, some of the codes of conduct on file are for agencies that no longer exist.375 Notably, several cabinet-level agencies have not filed a code of conduct with
the secretary of state. For example, the secretary of state does not have codes of
conduct filed for the department of public safety, economic development department, department of agriculture, and cultural affairs department.376

369. See N.M. STATE CORP. COMM’N, CODE OF CONDUCT (2004).
370. See N.M. COMM’R FOR PUB. LANDS, CODE OF CONDUCT (1993).
371. See STATE TREASURER, STATE OF N.M., EMPLOYEE CODE OF CONDUCT NO. 17-01 (2008).
372. See STATE TRANSP. AUTH., STATE OF N.M., CODE OF CONDUCT (1994). The transportation authority no longer exists. See N.M. Laws 1997, Ch. 52 § 8 (1997).
373. Compare NMSA 1978, Executive Agency Index (2009) (listing all statutorily-created executive,
legislative, and judicial agencies in New Mexico) with Appendix 3. An agency without its own code of conduct
filed with the New Mexico Secretary of State falls under the governor’s code of conduct. See supra Part III.F.
374. Under the government conduct act, agencies are required to file a code of conduct, or to follow the
code filed by the office of the governor. See supra Part IV.
375. See, e.g., supra notes 372, 355, and accompanying text.
376. See supra Appendix 3.
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